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INTRODUCTION
When first the Queene was crown’d, I lived well;
Butt Spaniards came, and Wyatt quicklie rose;
Whoe onelie meant outlandish force to quell:
To him adherent men didd mee suppose.
When hee had play’d his woefull tragedie;
Then next ensued my bitter comedie.1
—The Ghost of Nicholas Throckmorton (1874)
In the spring of 1554, the English Crown charged Nicholas Throckmorton, a
member of the Warwickshire gentry, with high treason for his alleged role in the
Wyatt Rebellion.2 Several months earlier Queen Mary Tudor, a Roman Catho-
lic, had risen to power and intended to marry Prince Phillip II of Spain.3
1. Throckmorton’s Ghost, THE LEGEND OF SIR NICHOLAS THROCKMORTON 29 (John Gough Nichols ed.,
1874).
2. See D. M. LOADES, TWO TUDOR CONSPIRACIES 95–97 (1965); see also THE TRIAL OF NICHOLAS
THROCKMORTON (Annabel Patterson ed., 1998) (reprinting the trial in full and including annotations); 4
RAPHAEL HOLINSHED, The Trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, in THE CHRONICLES OF ENGLAND, SCOT-
LAND, AND IRELAND 1737 (London, 1577) (reprinting the trial record without annotations). According to
the Crown, a faction of English noblemen planned to stage uprisings in several English counties before
converging on London to replace Queen Mary with her half-sister Elizabeth. See LOADES, supra at
15–19. One historian has theorized that the true purpose of Throckmorton’s treason trial was to
implicate Elizabeth, among others. See id. at 96.
3. See DAVID LOADES, THE REIGN OF MARY TUDOR: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND RELIGION IN ENGLAND
1553–1558, at 57–95 (2d ed., 1991) (discussing the turbulent political climate that existed at the outset
of Mary Tudor’s rule, and detailing the events leading to her marriage to Prince Phillip II of Spain).
Mary Tudor eventually married Phillip II in a lavish ceremony. See id. at 157–58 (noting that “[t]heir
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Powerful Protestant forces among the English highborn sought to ensure that
Queen Mary’s reign—and her marriage to Prince Phillip—was short-lived.4
Soon after the Queen’s ascension to the throne, Sir Thomas Wyatt of Kent and
several coconspirators allegedly hatched a plot, depending upon whom one
believes, to implore the Queen to marry an Englishman instead, or to assassi-
nate her.5
If convicted of high treason for his role in the rebellion, Throckmorton faced
execution at the Tower of London.6 As he faced his triers at Guildhall, he
pleaded to the tribunal to bring to him, “face to face to justify the matter,” with
the man whose confession brought Throckmorton to trial.7
Throckmorton’s trial at Guildhall was notable in one fundamental respect: the
Crown’s case against him for high treason consisted almost entirely of hearsay
evidence.8 The Crown presented as the centerpiece of its case against Throckmor-
ton the deposition of the Duke of Suffolk, who did not testify at trial.9 This
deposition included several hearsay statements that the Duke of Suffolk alleg-
edly heard from his brother,10 which suggested that Throckmorton “was privy to
wedding, which was celebrated on St James day (25 July) in Winchester cathedral, was a ceremony of
high emotional and political excitement”).
4. See JOHN BELLAMY, THE TUDOR LAW OF TREASON: AN INTRODUCTION 55 (1979) (“According to the
indictment, Throckmorton, with ten other gentlemen and in the company of certain traitors, had
compassed to deprive the queen of her crown and dignity and destroy her, and to take the Tower of
London and levy war against her.”); see also THE TRIAL OF NICHOLAS THROCKMORTON, supra note 2, at 7
(discussing how “Protestant courtiers . . . tried desperately and unsuccessfully to prevent [King Edward
VI’s] Roman Catholic elder sister, Mary Tudor, from succeeding him,” and asserting that the Wyatt
Rebellion was directed “against the new queen, and particularly against her planned marriage to Philip
II of Spain.”).
5. See BELLAMY, supra note 4, at 55 (detailing the plot “to deprive the queen of her crown and
dignity and destroy her” and “[c]ompassing to deprive the prince of his crown”). See generally THOMAS
DEKKER & JOHN WEBSTER, THE FAMOUS HISTORY OF SIR THOMAS WYAT (1607) (providing a detailed
chronology of Sir Thomas Wyatt and discussing the circumstances surrounding Wyatt’s Rebellion).
6. See BELLAMY, supra note 4, at 182 (explaining that “general governmental policy [in Tudor-era
England] was either to execute convicted traitors forthwith, or release them fairly soon after arraign-
ment”).
7. See H.B. WILSON, THE AMERICAN JUROR: BEING A GUIDE FOR JURYMEN THROUGHOUT THE UNITED
STATES 192–95 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1868) (highlighting important events from the trial
and recounting the exchange between Throckmorton and the Crown). Guildhall was the venue in which
ceremonies, trials, and other public events took place in London during the Tudor era. It still stands
today. See Guildhall, CITY OF LONDON, http://www.guildhall.cityoflondon.gov.uk/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2015).
8. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 313 (2d ed.
1900) (quoting from Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason, in which Raleigh expresses concern that he
“may be massacred by mere hearsay, as Sir Nicholas Throckmorton was like to have been in Queen
Mary’s time”).
9. See 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 328 (London,
MacMillan & Co. 1883) (“A deposition of the Duke of Suffolk was next read, on which Throckmorton
remarked that it stated only what the Duke said he had heard from his brother . . . .”).
10. Id.
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the whole devices against the Spaniards.”11
By all historical accounts, the tribunal was openly hostile to Throckmorton,12
and he was not allowed to cross-examine the Duke of Suffolk nor Suffolk’s
brother.13 Nonetheless, the defendant eloquently urged the jury not to convict
him on evidence from accusers who did not look him in the eye at trial.14
Although many of the alleged conspirators involved in the Wyatt Rebellion
were convicted,15 Throckmorton’s appeal to the jury was successful, and the
jury acquitted him.16 The verdict so outraged the Crown that it levied heavy
fines against the jurors and imprisoned them.17
The historical record from this trial does not answer one important question:
why did the jury decide to acquit Throckmorton when other English juries
convicted nearly all of his contemporaries? Although the historical record
suggests that the jury refused to convict Throckmorton because of the unfair-
ness of the procedures used by the Crown,18 including its reliance on hearsay
evidence,19 the basis for the jury’s dissatisfaction with hearsay remains a mystery.
The hearsay rule, a complex doctrine that purports to bar secondhand evi-
dence in court, has been characterized as a “spoiled child” by academic scholars
because of the disproportionate attention that it has received compared to other
principles of evidence.20 Despite the wealth of research that attempts to add
clarity to this increasingly complex doctrine, legal scholars and policymakers
11. 1 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND
OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 883 (London, R.
Bagshaw et al., 1809).
12. See, e.g., THE TRIAL OF NICHOLAS THROCKMORTON, supra note 2, at 8 (explaining that Throckmor-
ton’s trial was one of several “exemplary political trials, of considerable importance” to the Crown, and
noting that the jurors that acquitted Throckmorton “were subsequently imprisoned in the Tower and the
Fleet, and fined exorbitantly” for their verdict).
13. See STEPHEN, supra note 9, at 328 (reprinting the portion of the trial where the Duke of Suffolk’s
hearsay testimony was presented to the jurors in the Duke of Suffolk’s absence).
14. LOADES, supra note 2, at 97 (classifying Throckmorton’s performance at his trial as “a very able
defence,” noting its ten-hour duration, and stating that Throckmorton’s acquittal led to “rejoicings in the
City”); see also THE TRIAL OF NICHOLAS THROCKMORTON, supra note 2, at 20 (noting that “the drama of
the queen vs. Sir Nicholas Throckmorton unfolded . . . as a potential tragedy transformed by the wit and
intelligence of the protagonist into a political comedy of manners”).
15. See THE TRIAL OF NICHOLAS THROCKMORTON, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that “Wyatt and other
military leaders of the conspiracy were, of course, tried and executed” along with “Mary’s Protestant
rival, Lady Jane Grey”). But see LOADES, supra note 2, 110–14 (noting that other members of the
various uprisings escaped execution).
16. See LOADES, supra note 2, at 97. Many other famous English defendants were not so fortunate.
See THAYER, supra note 8, at 313 (discussing the trials of Sir Walter Raleigh, William Thomas, and Sir
Matthew Hale).
17. See LOADES, supra note 2, at 97.
18. See THE TRIAL OF NICHOLAS THROCKMORTON, supra note 2, at 19–20 (noting that modern readers
would “be puzzled—not to say shocked—” by “striking feature[s]” of the trial, which included denying
Throckmorton legal counsel and other rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution).
19. See THAYER, supra note 8, at 313 (including a quote from Sir Walter Raleigh at his trial,
suggesting Raleigh’s belief that Throckmorton was tried primarily on hearsay evidence).
20. JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS’ TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 238 (1935); Stephan
Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the
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are at odds with respect to its rationale. Although the rationales put forth vary,
they fall into two camps. The primary rationale put forth by scholars and rule
makers is that the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence promotes decisional accu-
racy by barring unreliable evidence from the courtroom.21 Others say, however,
that the hearsay rule promotes norms of procedural justice by disallowing
evidence from accusers who will not, as the expression goes, “look the accused
in the eye.”22
The primary rationale for the hearsay rule suffers from two important limita-
tions. First, if the removal from trials of potentially unreliable evidence will
decrease the risk of mistaken verdicts, it must be true that judicial fact finders
will place more emphasis on hearsay than it deserves, relative to its actual
probative value. Empirical research on how fact finders evaluate hearsay evi-
dence, however, casts serious doubt on this premise.23 Second, although the
empirical research to date casts doubt on the premise, it is actually very difficult
to measure how laypeople respond to hearsay, which makes definitive state-
ments regarding the role of the hearsay rule on the accuracy of verdicts difficult
to support.
The minority rationale—that the hearsay rule promotes litigants’ dignity
interests and increases the legitimacy of the tribunal to the public—has the
support of social psychological research and would add coherence to the
hearsay doctrine, but it currently suffers from a lack of empirical data. No one
has yet examined why laypeople appear to dislike hearsay evidence and why
they believe the rule against hearsay is in place.
This Article is the first to examine how laypeople respond to hearsay evi-
dence and is the first to test these competing theories against one another. This
Article hypothesizes that, like the jury who decided the fate of Nicholas
Throckmorton, laypeople will be dissatisfied with trials that include hearsay
evidence compared to trials that involve live witnesses who are subject to
Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 65, 65 (1991)
(mentioning this trend).
21. The first scholarly articulation of the decisional accuracy rationale was made by Professor
Edmund Morgan of Harvard Law School in the early 20th century. See Edmund M. Morgan, Some
Suggestions for Defining and Classifying Hearsay, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 258, 258–59 (1938) (noting that,
in crediting an in-court witness, the trier of fact evaluates the witness’s “perception, recollection,
narration and veracity” and explaining that crediting an in-court witness’s recounting of a hearsay
statement poses greater challenges to the fact finder). This rationale has been articulated in common law
opinions, however, since at least the 1800s. See Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of
Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1057, 1058 nn.5–6 (1986) (collecting cases
from England and the United States, dating back as far as 1812, and discussing the dangers of hearsay
evidence in terms of its effects on a fact finder’s accuracy).
22. The scholarly articulation of a fairness rationale for the rule barring hearsay evidence first
appeared explicitly in the 1980s. See Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86
MICH. L. REV. 51 (1987); Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
1339 (1987). See infra Part II for a more robust discussion of procedural justice.
23. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. See also Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries,
Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 893–96 (2015) (discussing over a dozen
studies that challenge the proposition that juries overvalue hearsay evidence).
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cross-examination. Moreover, this Article hypothesizes, based on research on a
psychological phenomenon called procedural justice, that participants prefer the
hearsay rule because the rule affords defendants dignity and respect by requir-
ing their accusers to look them in the eye.24 The Article will then argue that a
procedural justice rationale for barring hearsay evidence will lead to a more
coherent hearsay rule that enjoys the legitimacy of the public at large.
This Article serves as a sequel to my previous work, Testing Tribe’s Triangle:
Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance.25 In that previous work, I tested
whether the prevailing rationale for the rule barring hearsay evidence—that
jurors are likely to overvalue hearsay because the hearsay declarant is often
unavailable for cross-examination—withstands empirical scrutiny. This Article
builds on the conclusions reached in that previous work and explores a more
empirically sound rationale for the hearsay rule: that it increases popular
perceptions of the procedural justice afforded by the courts because it purports
to bar second-hand evidence from the courtroom.
Part I of this Article (1) discusses the conclusions reached in Testing Tribe’s
Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance and (2) argues that the
prevailing rationale for the rule barring hearsay evidence—that it promotes
decisional accuracy—is both empirically suspect and difficult to measure mean-
ingfully. Part II introduces an alternative rationale for the hearsay rule: proce-
dural justice. It also argues that a procedural justice rationale for the rule barring
hearsay evidence is superior to the prevailing rationale for the hearsay rule, and
that it is more likely to cultivate popular legitimacy for the rule. Parts III and IV
report the results from two original experimental studies that examine laypeo-
ple’s understandings about, and attitudes toward, hearsay evidence. Part V
explores the implications of these findings to hearsay policy, responds to
potential objections raised regarding the methodology of these studies and their
implications, and concludes that rule makers and scholars should fashion the
hearsay rule so that it explicitly promotes the interests of procedural justice and
fair play.
I. TESTING TRIBE’S TRIANGLE: THE INFERIORITY OF DECISIONAL ACCURACY
Because this Article builds upon—and serves as a sequel to—my prior work
in Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance,26 this
24. Procedural justice is defined as the perceived fairness of the process that is used to resolve
disputes and allocate resources. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
183 (2004). See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988) (reviewing theories on procedural justice and implications for legal, political, interper-
sonal, and work-related settings); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ANALYSIS (1975) (comparing whether adversary or inquisitorial procedures better serve procedural
justice); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (comparing the instrumental and normative
perspectives of procedural justice). For an in-depth discussion of the role of procedural justice in the
legal system, see infra Part II.
25. Sevier, supra note 23.
26. Id.
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Part will discuss the central argument raised in that work, the empirical test that
was conducted, and the conclusions that were reached with respect to the
prevailing rationale for the rule barring hearsay evidence. This Part will also
discuss the research questions that remained unanswered in my prior work and
how this Article addresses those questions.
A. EMPIRICAL WEAKNESSES
Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance exam-
ined the prevailing rationale for the rule barring hearsay, which refers to
out-of-court (often second-hand) statements that are proffered as evidence for
the truth of the matters asserted in the statements.27 My prior work noted that,
although courts purport to ban hearsay evidence when it is used for that
purpose, courts recognize—depending on how one counts—thirty-one different
exceptions to this rule, in which statements that, conceptually, are hearsay are
admitted into evidence for the truth of the matters asserted therein.28
Although policymakers and scholars have hypothesized several different
rationales for the hearsay rule—in a manner reminiscent of a Whac-a-Mole
carnival game29—they break down into two camps: a prevailing rationale and a
minority rationale.30 The prevailing rationale for the rule barring hearsay evi-
27. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make
while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement.”); FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (“‘Statement’ means a person’s oral assertion,
written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.”); FED. R. EVID. 802
(“Hearsay is not admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: a federal statute; these
rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”).
28. See FED R. EVID. 801(d) (allowing into evidence hearsay statements from opposing parties in
litigation, statements of coconspirators, and prior statements from testifying witnesses); FED R. EVID.
803 (allowing into evidence hearsay statements that qualify as present sense impressions; excited
utterances; statements made for the purpose of seeking medical diagnosis or treatment; business
records; public records; ancient documents; statements of then-existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition; family records; recorded recollections; and learned treatises, among others); FED. R. EVID.
804 (allowing into evidence, when the declarant in unavailable, hearsay statements that qualify as dying
declarations; statements of personal or family history; former testimony; statements against interest;
and statements from declarants who became unavailable through a party’s wrongful actions); FED. R.
EVID. 807 (allowing into evidence hearsay statements that do not qualify for admissibility under FED. R.
EVID. 801, 803 or 804 if, among other criteria, the statement “has equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness”).
The United States Supreme Court has, however, limited the admissibility of hearsay statements used
against a defendant in a criminal trial if those otherwise admissible statements violate the Confrontation
Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69
(2004) (stating that “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the
one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation”); see also Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344,
348–49 (2011) (clarifying the types of statements that are testimonial and, therefore, invoke the
Confrontation Clause); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008) (same); Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (same).
29. See Sevier, supra note 23, at 890 (“The rationale for the rule barring hearsay is a moving target
at best and, at worst, a futile game of policy Whac-A-Mole.”).
30. This Article does not argue that the prevailing and minority rationales that scholars have
proffered to justify the existence of the rule barring hearsay evidence are mutually exclusive or
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dence argues that second-hand hearsay evidence should be excluded because it
lacks the reliability of in-court testimony, which is tested under oath, through
cross-examination, in an environment in which jurors observe the witness’s
demeanor while testifying.31 Because out-of-court statements are often not
presented to a jury under those circumstances, evidence policymakers believe
that there is a substantial risk that fact finders will overvalue those out-of-court
statements.32
In his influential article, Triangulating Hearsay, Professor Laurence Tribe of
Harvard Law School succinctly conceptualized the prevailing rationale for the
hearsay rule, which focuses primarily on the efficacy of cross-examination.33
Professor Tribe noted that common law judges recognized four capacities that
affect all testimony presented by witnesses in court: the witness’s narrative
clarity, sincerity, perception of the event to which the witness testifies, and the
witness’s memory for the event.34 Professor Tribe then conceptualized these
capacities in terms of a “testimonial triangle.”35 His triangle, illustrated below
in my prior work, raises two questions that fact finders must ask of witnesses:
(1) Does the witness’s in-court statement reflect her true belief about the event?
and (2) if so, does the witness’s true belief about the event reflect what actually
occurred?36 Professor Tribe noted that the first question—the left leg of the
incompatible. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court majority’s holding in Crawford v. Washington implicates
more than one single rationale for the rule barring hearsay evidence. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–54.
This Article examines which of these rationales should be the primary rationale for the doctrine, which
in turn, will have implications for the future direction of the hearsay rule.
31. See, e.g., JAMES F. BAILEY, III & OSCAR M. TRELLES, II, Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem,
in 2 THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 152, 153 (1980)
(noting that “[t]he belief, or perhaps hope, that cross-examination is effective in exposing imperfections
of perception, memory, and narration” underlies the rule barring hearsay evidence, and that some
hearsay is admitted into evidence under the current hearsay scheme when the circumstances surround-
ing the evidence “furnish guarantees of trustworthiness”); see also Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948) (espousing the
common law objections to hearsay evidence); Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of
Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 167–68 (2006); Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87
HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974) (describing the common law objections to hearsay and conceptualizing them
into a “[t]estimonial [t]riangle”). This rationale is also explicitly stated by evidence rule makers in the
Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying Federal Rule of Evidence 803. The Advisory Committee’s
Note argues, without citing empirical evidence, that “[t]he present rule proceeds upon the theory that
under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even though he may be
available.” FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note; see also Park, supra note 21, at 1057 (“The
conventional explanation for the exclusion of hearsay centers on the danger of admitting evidence that
has not been tested for reliability. Unlike courtroom witnesses, hearsay declarants have not testified
under oath, in the presence of the trier of fact, and subject to cross-examination.”).
32. BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 31, at 153.
33. Tribe, supra note 31.
34. See id. at 958. These testimonial capacities are now embodied in the personal knowledge
requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 602 and the oath or affirmation that witnesses undertake
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 603. See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING
EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM 160 (3d ed. 2014).
35. Tribe, supra note 31, at 959.
36. See id.
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triangle—depends on the witness’s narrative clarity and sincerity.37 The second
question—the right leg of the triangle—depends on the witness’s accurate
perception of, and memory for, the event to which she testifies.38 A failure of
any of these testimonial capacities—which should be exposed upon cross-
examination of the witness—should cause the fact finder to decrease the
probative value that she assigns the witness’s testimony.39
The difficulty with hearsay evidence, according to the reliability rationale for
excluding it, is that hearsay testimony is often subject to two testimonial
triangles: the testimonial triangle of the in-court witness and the triangle
belonging to the out-of-court hearsay declarant. And, most importantly, the
testimonial triangle that belongs to the out-of-court hearsay declarant is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to meaningfully evaluate through cross-examination.41
Thus, the reliability rationale states that hearsay evidence contains the risk of
overvaluation by the fact finder, who is likely to place too much probative
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 958–61.
40. This figure originally appeared in my article Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and
Psychological Distance. Sevier, supra note 23, at 893.
41. The Federal Rules of Evidence do allow parties, to the extent possible, to impeach the credibility
of out-of-court declarants. See FED. R. EVID. 806 (stating that, when a hearsay statement “has been
admitted in evidence, the declarant’s credibility may be attacked, and then supported, by any evidence
that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness”).
Figure 1: The Testimonial Triangle40
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weight on risky, potentially unreliable evidence.42
This is, of course, an empirical claim about how fact finders—and in particu-
lar, jurors—reach decisions regarding how to weigh evidence. And although
social psychological evidence strongly suggests that jurors are skeptical of
hearsay evidence,43 the premise of the testimonial triangle—insofar as it embod-
ies the prevailing rationale for the rule barring hearsay evidence—had not yet
been tested directly.
In Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, I
tested this rationale empirically through the lens of the social psychological
phenomena termed “construal level theory.”44 In two studies reported in this
prior work, I presented laypeople with trial vignettes in which I manipulated (1)
the type of testimonial capacity at issue in the case; and (2) the identity of the
individual whose capacity was at issue—either the in-court witness’s capacity,
the out-of-court hearsay declarant’s capacity, neither, or both.45 I then examined
the probative weight that the participants had placed on the evidence.46
The data that I collected challenged the view—implicit in the prevailing
rationale for the hearsay rule—that jurors systematically overvalue hearsay
evidence. Instead, I found that jurors tend to be skeptical of hearsay evidence,
and they do not give it the same weight that they give in-court testimony that is
subject to cross-examination.47 Further, I found that jurors were sensitive to
weaknesses in an individual’s testimonial capacities, and not just with respect to
in-court witnesses, but with respect to out-of-court hearsay declarants as well.48
In a follow-up experiment, I examined how mock jurors respond to “hearsay
within hearsay,” which occurs when a hearsay statement itself also contains
hearsay.49 If jurors discount out-of-court statements because such statements are
not subject to the scrutiny of cross-examination, then we would expect hearsay
statements that contain additional levels of hearsay to be even less persuasive to
jurors than “ordinary” hearsay statements.50 And, indeed, the data suggested
42. See supra note 21.
43. See Sevier, supra note 23, at 893–96 (discussing, in detail, the results from over a dozen
empirical studies examining mock jurors’ attitudes toward hearsay and their decisions in cases that
involve hearsay). The experiments strongly suggest that jurors discount hearsay evidence sharply and
that they pay attention to cognitive and motivational factors that threaten to decrease the probative
value of hearsay. See id.
44. See Sevier, supra note 23, at 896–900 (explaining the tenets of construal level theory and
discussing several experiments in which construal level theory has been tested).
45. Id. at 903–15.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 914–15 (discussing the results of Study 1).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 915–22. Hearsay statements that are embedded within other hearsay statements are the
subject of Federal Rule of Evidence 805: “Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule against
hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.” FED. R. EVID.
805.
50. See Sevier, supra note 23, at 916 (discussing the hypothesis that “jurors are most persuaded by
non-hearsay testimony, less persuaded by hearsay, even less persuaded by double hearsay, and least
persuaded by triple hearsay testimony” ).
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that jurors systematically devalue out-of-court statements consistent with the
degree of hearsay that is contained in those statements.51 In sum, the studies
suggest that jurors are more careful in evaluating hearsay statements than
evidence policymakers believe, and the data suggest that the prevailing rationale
for the rule barring hearsay evidence—that jurors will overvalue risky, poten-
tially unreliable evidence—may not be empirically valid.52
B. THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM
Although it is discussed in passing in my prior work, this Article expands on
another difficulty with respect to the prevailing rationale for the hearsay rule. To
the extent that scholars can measure the extent to which jurors weigh hearsay
evidence, it appears that jurors weigh it more carefully than evidence policymak-
ers have acknowledged.53 But a second argument that challenges the reliability
rationale for the hearsay rule stems from an entirely different perspective:
because it is difficult—or even impossible—to truly measure whether jurors
give appropriate weight to hearsay evidence, the decisional accuracy rationale
for the hearsay rule is an unfalsifiable empirical prediction regarding how jurors
respond to hearsay.
Empirical research contributes significantly to our understanding of how
laypeople process and weigh hearsay information. These studies suggest, strongly,
that jurors do not afford hearsay evidence the same weight that they afford
in-court testimony.54 But it is far more difficult to argue that these studies show
that laypeople act rationally with respect to how they process hearsay evidence,
or that laypeople afford hearsay evidence its appropriate weight.
To determine that jurors make rational decisions with respect to hearsay
evidence, we require data showing not only that jurors discount hearsay evi-
dence compared to nonhearsay, but that they also discount that evidence by the
correct amount. This normative claim is difficult to argue because it presup-
poses that the meaning—and probativeness—of a piece of evidence has a fixed
value that can be measured reliably.55 Unfortunately, assessing the probative
value of evidence is a topic that has vexed legal scholars for decades; there is
51. See id. (discussing the results of Study 2).
52. See id. at 922–28 (discussing the results from Study 1 and Study 2 and exploring their
implications).
53. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Landsman & Rakos, supra note 20, at 66, 76; see also Margaret Bull Kovera et al.,
Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 707, 719 (1992); Peter
Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683,
685, 691 (1992).
55. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41
VAND. L. REV. 879 (1998) (illustrating the inherent difficulties of probative value calculations);
Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood
Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859 (1996) (explaining the difficulties of measuring
probative value in the scientific evidence context).
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currently no prevailing theory of how to appropriately measure various pieces
of evidence, nor is there an agreed-upon manner to assess how closely legal
decision makers adhere to that measurement.56
The second study reported in Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and
Psychological Distance provides a good example of this problem.57 In that
study, which examined the effects of hearsay within hearsay on jurors’ determi-
nations of a defendant’s guilt, participants’ determinations of the likelihood of
the defendant’s guilt decreased as the degree of hearsay presented to them
increased, which suggests a careful evaluation of the hearsay evidence.58
Yet the slope of the line that connects the means in each experimental
condition indicated that there was a drop-off in the amount that jurors dis-
counted when they encountered triple hearsay instead of double hearsay.60
Although this data suggest that jurors carefully examined the hearsay evidence
and made a reasonable judgment regarding the weight to afford it, it is norma-
tively difficult to argue that the jurors weighed the evidence correctly.61
In sum, the central rationale for the rule barring hearsay evidence—that
unreliable hearsay evidence is a threat to the decisional accuracy of the legal
fact finder—is fraught with problems. First, the accuracy of a fact finder’s
weighing of hearsay evidence is difficult to determine because there is no
objective standard for attributing probative value to that evidence, and so it may
56. Indeed, for these reasons, and others, some scientists and scholars have called for an abandon-
ment of using probative value calculations to evaluate the competency of various legal actors. See, e.g.,
John T. Wixted & Laura Mickes, The Field of Eyewitness Memory Should Abandon Probative Value
and Embrace Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 275 (2012).
57. See Sevier, supra note 23, at 915–22.
58. See id. at 920.
59. This figure originally appeared in Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological
Distance. Id.
60. See id. at 920–21 (reporting the study results).
61. Nonetheless, the clear pattern in the data suggests, at a minimum, reasonable, systematic
decision making by mock jurors with respect to hearsay. Id.
Figure 2: How Jurors Respond to Hearsay Within Hearsay59
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be impossible to evaluate whether legal fact finders weigh the evidence in the
appropriate amount. If so, then the proposition that the hearsay rule safeguards
the accuracy of legal verdicts is empirically unfalsifiable, because there is no
true way to test that assertion scientifically.
Second, to the extent that we can measure how jurors respond to hearsay,
social science evidence strongly suggests that the decisional accuracy rationale
for the rule barring hearsay evidence has little empirical basis.62 The extensive
social science research on hearsay evidence suggests, at the very least, that
jurors are suspicious of hearsay evidence and view it with measured skepticism.
II. THE SUPERIORITY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Against this background, I turn to the minority rationale for prohibiting
hearsay evidence, and examine whether it is—both conceptually and empiri-
cally—the better rationale for the rule. This alternative to the prevailing ratio-
nale for the hearsay rule focuses on the dignity interests of litigants who face
their accusers in court. This rationale supports prohibiting hearsay not
because of its potential to cloud the decision-making process, but because of the
perceived unseemliness of the use of such evidence. This rationale has intuitive
appeal and, as discussed below, also has empirical support.
At its core, a procedural justice rationale for the hearsay rule stems from the
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, which was discussed at length in Testing Tribe’s
Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance.63 In sum, Raleigh was
executed on what scholars now believe to be unreliable hearsay evidence, and
his trial sparked outrage amongst the British citizenry.64 His trial is believed to
have been the impetus for, among other legal innovations, the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.65
One important question raised by the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh remains
unanswered: what was the source of public outrage with Raleigh’s trial? Was
the outrage based on the jury’s apparent overweighing of the hearsay evidence
against Raleigh, or was the outrage based on the Crown’s abject refusal to
produce as witnesses its hearsay declarants—one of whom had been in the
Crown’s custody not far from the hall in which Raleigh was tried—despite
Raleigh’s pleas for the Crown to do so?66 It is possible that the popular outrage
over the verdict in Raleigh’s trial was attributable to the latter—and not
the former—rationale.
Scholars that subscribe to a procedural justice rationale for the rule barring
hearsay evidence argue that there exists a dignity interest in requiring out-of-
court accusers to face the accused, which is distinct from the jury’s ability (or
62. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
63. See Sevier, supra note 23, at 881–82 (discussing Raleigh’s trial).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 882 (discussing the implications of Raleigh’s trial and execution).
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inability) to weigh the probative value of out-of-court hearsay statements.
Scholars frame this dignity interest in a variety of ways, but at its core, this
interest has little to do with decisional accuracy, and instead focuses on notions
of fairness and justice in the process used to resolve legal disputes. This focus
on process—which social psychologists term procedural justice—might provide
a more theoretically coherent and empirically accurate rationale for the hearsay
rule, particularly compared to the current, prevailing rationale for excluding
hearsay.67 To that end, this Article explores the concept of procedural justice in
greater detail and tests empirically whether it aligns with popular notions of the
purpose that the hearsay bar serves in judicial disputes.
In the sections below, I make three claims. First, I argue that, unlike the
decisional accuracy rationale for the hearsay rule, dignity and justice concerns
over the use of hearsay are supported by legal scholarship as well as experimen-
tal social psychology research. Second, I argue that a procedural justice ratio-
nale would lead to a more coherent and streamlined hearsay rule compared to
how the doctrine currently stands. And finally, I argue—with original empirical
evidence—that procedural justice considerations align with laypeople’s views
about the values that the hearsay rule is designed to protect.
A. THEORETICAL SUPPORT
The minority view expressed by some commentators, rule makers, and
scholars68 invokes principles entirely different from decisional accuracy when
justifying the ban on hearsay evidence at trial. Instead, these scholars focus on
the effect of the admission of hearsay evidence on the legitimacy of the legal
institutions that accept such evidence. This section will first explore the theoreti-
cal dignity arguments raised by legal academia, and then will explore the social
psychology literature on procedural justice.
1. Legal Theories of Fairness
Although most legal scholarship on the hearsay rule focuses on the role of the
rule in safeguarding the accuracy of a legal fact finder’s decisions, a few
scholars have proposed justifications for the rule barring hearsay evidence that
focus instead on notions of fairness and dignity. For example, Professor Eleanor
Swift has written that laypeople will likely view verdicts that rely on hearsay
evidence as the result of an unfair process—a process in which accusers are not
required to look the accused in the eye—which may cause them to discredit the
legal system.69 By this logic, the public outrage over the outcome of the trial of
Sir Walter Raleigh did not stem from a belief that Raleigh’s tribunal was
67. See infra Part II.A and Part II.B for a robust discussion of procedural justice.
68. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
69. See Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 495, 495 (1987) (“[R]eliance
on . . . hearsay declarants threatens important values related to the rationality and fairness of trial
adjudication.” (emphasis added)).
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hoodwinked by unreliable evidence. Rather, the outrage stemmed from the lack
of respect that Raleigh was afforded by not confronting his accuser in court. It is
an open question regarding whether the public’s view toward hearsay evidence
has shifted since Raleigh’s trial, but the presence of rules of evidence that bar
hearsay evidence70 as well as a constitutional rule that bars evidence in criminal
cases where defendants could not confront their accusers71 provides some
evidence that the same concerns about hearsay evidence that existed during
Raleigh’s trial still exist today.
Recent Supreme Court decisions examining the intersection between hearsay
exceptions and the Confrontation Clause provide additional, if ambivalent,
support for the view that the rule against hearsay evidence is derived from
concerns about procedural legitimacy and fairness. Although the Court had
previously interpreted the Confrontation Clause so that it posed little threat to
the admission of hearsay evidence in criminal trials,72 the Court reversed course
in Crawford v. Washington.73 In Crawford, the Court evaluated the constitution-
ality of hearsay statements made to a police officer, which had been corrobo-
rated by other evidence in the case.74 The Court reversed the defendant’s
conviction and held the hearsay statements inadmissible because the accused
had not actually been confronted by his accuser.75 In reaching this result, the
Court argued that the hearsay statements were inadmissible not because they
might be unreliable, but because their inclusion in the trial offended a dignity
interest to which the defendant is entitled under the Sixth Amendment.76
Although the Court’s decision also included occasional references to the ability
of cross-examination to strengthen the reliability of evidence presented to the
fact finder,77 later Supreme Court decisions interpreting Crawford continued to
focus on the dignity interests of confronting one’s accusers at trial when
70. Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence regulates the use of hearsay evidence at trial. See
FED. R. EVID. 801–807.
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (noting that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him”).
72. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (“In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present
for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”).
73. 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004).
74. See id. at 38, 42.
75. See id. at 68–69 (“Roberts notwithstanding, we decline to mine the record in search of indicia of
reliability. Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”).
76. See id. at 68 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what
the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”).
77. See id. at 61 (acknowledging the value of testing the reliability of hearsay statements “in the
crucible of cross-examination”).
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deciding whether hearsay evidence is admissible in criminal trials.78
Other scholars reach the same conclusion, although their focus is different.
Recall that Professor Eleanor Swift expressed concern that if hearsay statements
were not generally barred from legal proceedings under a formal set of rules,
Federal Rule of Evidence 403—which excludes relevant evidence if its proba-
tive value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect79—would become the de facto
mechanism by which tribunals evaluate hearsay.80 Professor Roger Park has
expressed similar concerns that abolishing the formal rules barring hearsay
evidence would give judges too much discretionary power to admit statements
that, in their view, are reliable.81 Thus, evaluating hearsay statements under
Rule 403 would likely allow into evidence significantly more hearsay state-
ments than the current rules allow—which raises the concerns expressed by
Professor Swift and implied by Professor Park82—and would also feed into the
perception that legal tribunals arbitrarily decide which hearsay statements to
allow into evidence.83 This perceived arbitrariness would raise additional con-
cerns about the legitimacy of tribunals that allow such evidence to be heard at
trial.
78. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 348–49 (2011) (following Crawford and clarifying that
the primary purpose of a testimonial hearsay statement is one that does not seek assistance for an
ongoing emergency); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008) (using actual confrontation as a
guide and implying that statements about past emergencies are not testimonial); Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 829–30 (2006) (using actual confrontation as its guiding principle and clarifying that a
testimonial statement is usually spoken after the events have occurred).
79. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
80. See Swift, supra note 69, at 499; see also Sevier, supra note 23, at 890 nn.47–49 (discussing
Professor Swift’s contribution to understanding the policy rationales that underlie the hearsay rule).
81. Park, supra note 21, at 1060 & n.11 (noting, without explicitly referencing Rule 403, that in such
a scheme “judges would have more discretion and stronger control” over hearsay statements that are
admitted into evidence and noting that “[t]he fear of unbridled discretion has been one of the bar’s
primary reasons for opposing these proposals for broader admission of hearsay”). For example,
consider the case of United States v. Bowman, 302 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002). Bowman was charged
with racketeering, drug offenses, and conspiracy to commit murder when he was the international
president of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club. See id. at 1231, 1238–39. The Club had a generally
unsavory history, and its constitution contained a clause restricting its membership to white men. See id.
1238–39. Although Bowman was not charged with any form of discrimination, the district court
allowed into evidence an unredacted version of the Club’s constitution as proof of other matters in the
case, and the defendant was convicted. See id. at 1239. The appellate court held that the trial court’s
ruling was an abuse of its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, but because of the other
evidence against the defendant, the appellate court held that the district court’s error was harmless. Id.
at 1239–40. Decisions regarding hearsay evidence—which would be decided under Rule 403 if the
hearsay bar were eliminated—would likely be subject to similar judicial discretion.
82. Professor Park raises additional fairness concerns that underlie the hearsay rule, including the
“mischief” of perjury in court (regardless of its effect on accurate fact-finding), the potential for jurors
to reach inequitable verdicts by disingenuously relying on hearsay evidence, the potential impacts on
the speedy disposition of weak cases, and the cost to parties in obtaining and developing evidence to
rebut hearsay statements from out-of-court declarants. See Park, supra note 21, at 1058–59.
83. See Swift, supra note 69, at 499; Park, supra note 21, at 1060.
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2. Social Psychological Support
In addition to legal scholarship that has examined, theoretically, the role that
dignity and fairness interests should play in constructing a hearsay rule that
attains popular legitimacy, there also is a plethora of social psychological
evidence that suggests the prohibition on hearsay evidence serves an important—
and real—dignity function. This research on the psychological phenomenon of
procedural justice is outlined below.
Traditional law and economics scholars have hypothesized that people seek
to maximize their self-interest and pursue opportunities that bring about the
greatest possible material advantage.84 If this were always true, we would
expect that people prefer legal systems that provide them with the best eco-
nomic outcomes.85 Although research suggests that outcomes do matter with
respect to people’s procedural preferences,86 the full psychological story is
more complex. In conferring legitimacy onto a legal decision, people are
remarkably sensitive to whether the process for reaching that decision was
fair.87 This phenomenon, known as procedural justice, predicts that “people’s
reactions to their experiences with legal authorities are strongly shaped by their
subjective evaluations of the justice of the procedures used to resolve their
case.”88 In short, independent of outcomes, the manner in which a legal dispute
is decided can predict people’s preferences for certain legal procedures, percep-
tions of the decision maker’s legitimacy, and their willingness to abide by the
decision maker’s judgments.
Researchers have identified several procedural factors that influence people’s
perceptions of the legitimacy of a decision-making body: the decision maker’s
neutrality (that is, that the decision is based on rules and facts instead of the
decision maker’s intuition), the degree of respect and dignity that the decision
maker confers on the parties, the amount of voice and control that the parties
84. See generally LYNN A. STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE
(2011) (discussing empirical evidence on the role of an individual’s conscience in everyday decision
making and arguing that people frequently make decisions in daily life that traditional law and
economics scholars would classify as irrational). See also JOHN W. THIBAUT & HAROLD H. KELLEY, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS (1959) (noting the traditional law and economics rationality arguments
and examining them in the context of social interactions involving group norms, interdependence, and
rewards and punishments).
85. See generally LIND & TYLER, supra note 24 (examining the conditions under which laypeople
will legitimize the judgments of a decision maker and finding that several factors, including the
perceived fairness of the process used by the decision maker, affects the willingness of laypeople to
legitimize the decision maker’s judgments).
86. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65,
71 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
87. See generally Tom Tyler & David Markell, The Public Regulation of Land-Use Decisions:
Criteria for Evaluating Alternative Procedures, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 538, 569–70 (2010). See also E.
Allan Lind, Robin I. Lissak & Donald E. Conlon, Decision Control and Process Control Effects on
Procedural Fairness Judgments, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 338, 348 (1983) (“The results of the
present study suggest that there is a process control effect on fairness independent of the decision
control accorded those affected by the procedure’s outcome.”).
88. Tyler & Markell, supra note 87, at 541 (internal citations omitted).
2016] 659POPULARIZING HEARSAY
have over the legal dispute, and the degree to which parties can trust the
decision maker’s motive to be fair.89 These factors manifest themselves in the
laboratory and outside the laboratory90 and in both criminal and civil disputes.91
Procedural justice is a robust phenomenon and its implications are far-
reaching. In legal adjudication, perceptions of fair process can confer legitimacy
on legal actors, including judges92 and juries.93 Procedural justice can also
affect perceptions of legitimacy in alternative dispute resolution, including
mediation and arbitration, as well as the legitimacy of the decision makers in
those paradigms.94
Not only do perceptions of fair treatment influence people’s preferences in
the courtroom, they also influence people’s preferences in the legal system
outside the courtroom and in nonlegal contexts.95 For example, affording those
who have been stopped by the police an explanation for their detainment and a
chance to explain themselves to a law enforcement officer increases people’s
perceptions of law enforcement legitimacy.96 Moreover, perceptions of proce-
dural fairness can increase perceptions of legitimacy (and a willingness to abide
by decisions) in nonlegal relationships that involve power dynamics, including
superior-subordinate relationships in the workplace97 and in the family.98
Psychological researchers have sought to understand the reasons why lay-
people care about the process by which legal adjudications are made. In a
famous set of studies expounding on the “value-expressive” function of proce-
dural justice,99 Professor Tom Tyler and others found that, by allowing litigants
89. See Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 117 (2000).
90. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 135 (2011).
91. See E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRA-
TION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 13–14 (1990), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/
2007/R3809.pdf (evaluating these factors in the context of civil disputes that are the subject of
court-annexed arbitration); see also Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional
Accuracy and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 212, 214–15 (2014) (finding no difference between criminal and civil settings with respect
to participants’ perceptions of procedural justice in a mock trial vignette study).
92. See TYLER, supra note 24, at 19, 30–33.
93. See Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury:
Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 350 (1988).
94. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural
Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473, 478–79 (2008)
(discussing negotiation); see also LIND, supra note 91 (discussing arbitration).
95. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 90, at 133.
96. See Tom R. Tyler & Robert Folger, Distributional and Procedural Aspects of Satisfaction with
Citizen-Police Encounters, 1 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 281 (1980).
97. See Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings:
The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2005).
98. See Shelly Jackson & Mark Fondacaro, Procedural Justice in Resolving Family Conflict:
Implications for Youth Violence Prevention, 21 LAW & POL’Y 101, 118–20 (1999).
99. Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski & Nancy Spodick, Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with
Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 73 (1985).
In a related study, researchers provided participants with a set of demanding, time-sensitive tasks to
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an opportunity to present their side of the dispute to the decision maker,100 by
affording them respect as they do so,101 and by doing so in an unbiased
manner,102 litigants felt valued and respected by the decision maker as members
of society.103
Thus, the mere ability of participants to express themselves to the tribunal in
these studies was found to predict participants’ feelings of dignity, respect, and
the fairness of the process for adjudicating the dispute. In the hearsay context,
we can imagine similar dignity interests implicated. These studies suggest that
laypeople focus strongly not only on substantive outcomes, but also on the
process for obtaining those outcomes, when they evaluate their satisfaction with
a legal proceeding. The empirical evidence therefore implies that, to the extent
that laypeople dislike hearsay evidence, their concerns over this type of evi-
dence may relate to the perceived fairness of the way hearsay is used in court,
rather than the substantive effect it may have on the tribunal’s decision.104
complete, and participants were assigned to one of three conditions: (1) a forum in which they were not
allowed to present their opinions about the tasks to the decision maker; (2) a forum in which they were
allowed to do so; and (3) a forum in which they were allowed to present their opinions after the task
was completed, and were explicitly told that their opinions would have no effect on the authority
figure’s decisions. See E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer & P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control, and
Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 954–55 (1990). When asked how satisfied they were with the proceeding,
participants who were not allowed to present their opinions were the least satisfied and participants who
were able to present their opinions were the most satisfied. See id. at 955–56. But the participants who
could present their opinions after-the-fact—even though they knew it would not affect the outcome—
were significantly more satisfied than those who could not present their side of the case, even though
they received the same substantive outcome. See id.
100. See Tom R. Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of Procedural
Justice: A Test of Four Models, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 341 (1987) (describing
“consideration of views” as an important mediator of “voice effects” in citizens’ perceptions of
procedural justice).
101. See id. at 343 (“Studies in the legal, managerial, and political arenas have found that citizens
place great value on being treated politely and having respect shown for their rights. These are aspects
of the interaction that are directed at reinforcing citizens’ positive self-image and sense of personal
worth . . . .”); Tyler & Markell, supra note 87, at 548 (discussing the role of trust and respect in
laypeople’s perceptions of procedural justice).
102. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 831 (1989) (“In any particular situation people will be concerned
with having an unbiased decision maker who is honest and who uses appropriate factual information to
make decisions.”).
103. See Tyler, supra note 100, at 343 (describing the impact of voice effects on a citizen’s
self-esteem, self-image, and perception of personal worth); see also Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A
Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 165 (1992)
(noting the effects of “standing, trust, and neutrality” on the willingness of people to legitimize
authority figures and explaining that “the source of information about these factors is the social process
and the procedures that the authority uses”). See generally Tyler, supra note 102 (reporting an empirical
test of the “group-value” model of procedural justice, which hypothesizes that concerns over the
fairness of adjudicative processes implicates social psychological factors that influence self-esteem).
104. For a nonempirical perspective on procedural legitimacy, see generally Solum, supra note 24.
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B. DOCTRINAL COHERENCE
A procedural justice rationale for the rule barring hearsay is supported by
empirical social psychology research. Armed with this understanding, evidence
policymakers can use a procedural justice rationale for the hearsay rule to make
the rule more conceptually coherent. Particularly, a procedural justice rationale
for the hearsay rule would eliminate many of the empirically dubious excep-
tions to the rule, which rely on empirically untested notions regarding the
reliability of such evidence. It would also eliminate the current disparity be-
tween the role of the Confrontation Clause in cases involving hearsay in civil
and criminal disputes. These issues are discussed in detail below.
The general proposition that second-hand evidence should be barred from
dispute resolution proceedings because the evidence has not been cross-
examined appears, initially, as a straightforward rule. The difficulty, however, is
that this straightforward principle contains nearly thirty exceptions, which are
found primarily in Federal Rules of Evidence 801, 803, and 804.105 Moreover,
the rationales for these exceptions are wildly different: the Rule 803 exceptions
focus on reliability and decisional accuracy, whereas Rule 804 exceptions focus
on fairness and equity.106
Many of the exceptions to the rule barring hearsay evidence under Federal
Rule of Evidence 803 could be streamlined dramatically by focusing on proce-
dural justice as the rationale for disallowing hearsay evidence, instead of
decisional accuracy. Rule 803’s reliability exceptions, as scholars have noted,
are based on untested notions about human cognition and behavior.107 It is not
obvious that an utterance made while a speaker is excited is likely to be truthful,
105. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)–(2), 803(1)–(23), & 804(1)–(6).
106. Compare FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (stating, while providing no empirical
evidence in support, that “[t]he present rule proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate circum-
stances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to
justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available”), and FED.
R. EVID. 803(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (explaining the rationale for the excited utterance
exception as “simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily
stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication”), with FED. R.
EVID. 804(b) advisory committee’s note (“Rule 803 . . . is based upon the assumption that a hearsay
statement falling within one of its exceptions possesses qualities which justify the conclusion that
whether the declarant is available or unavailable is not a relevant factor in determining admissibility.
The instant [R]ule [804] proceeds upon a different theory: hearsay which admittedly is not equal in
quality to testimony of the declarant on the stand may nevertheless be admitted if the declarant is
unavailable and if his statement meets a specified standard. . . . [H]earsay, if of the specified quality, is
preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the declarant.”).
107. See Maithilee K. Pathak & William C. Thompson, From Child to Witness to Jury Effects of
Suggestion on the Transmission and Evaluation of Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 372, 373
(1999) (“However, these fears are primarily grounded in a psychological intuition: Courts have
traditionally assumed, without much empirical basis, that jurors do not appreciate fully the unreliability
of hearsay testimony . . . .”); Justin Sevier, Omission Suspicion: Juries, Hearsay, and Attorneys’
Strategic Choices, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2012) (“For example, the law of evidence is premised
largely on codified but empirically untested folk wisdom regarding how legal actors, like jurors,
behave.”).
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as Rule 803(2) supposes,108 or that people are always honest with their health-
care providers, as Rule 803(4) supposes.109
These empirically dubious behavioral assumptions can cause not only inaccu-
rate legal decisions, but also moral hazards with respect to litigants’ pretrial
actions in which savvy litigants could decide to strategically lie to their doctors
on the expectation that the otherwise inadmissible lie would be admissible
under a hearsay exception. A procedural justice rationale for the hearsay rule
would remove these empirically dubious exceptions to the rule, while the other
reliability exceptions that focus on the integrity of books, records, or other
documents110 could remain if policymakers believe that this evidence does not
offend the procedural dignity of the party to whom it is used against.111
A procedural justice rationale for the hearsay rule would also add doctrinal
coherence with respect to the manner in which the hearsay rule is applied in
criminal and civil trials. The hearsay rule currently intersects with the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause only in criminal cases.112 Under the Supreme
Court’s current Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, the same out-of-court state-
ment (that was excluded in a criminal trial) is admissible in a civil proceeding
against the defendant, provided that the statement fits into one of the hearsay
exceptions listed in Rule 803 or 804. The rationales provided for this differen-
tial admissibility of testimonial hearsay—which center on increased protections
for criminal defendants relative to civil defendants—are viewed by many
scholars as unconvincing,113 and a procedural justice rationale for the hearsay
rule would remedy this inequality by excluding testimonial hearsay from both
tribunals.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, of course,
represents a floor below which an individual’s rights cannot fall.114 As a matter
of policy, states and the federal government are free to expand on those rights
and provide greater protections to individuals. If the hearsay rule is premised on
the notion that, no matter the tribunal, the accused has a dignity interest in
facing her accuser, the same principles that underlie the Supreme Court’s
108. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note.
109. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note. Indeed, the limited empirical evidence on
this topic suggests the opposite. See, e.g., Karen Ravn, Body of Lies: Patients Aren’t 100% Honest with
Doctors, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/08/health/he-lying8.
110. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)–(18).
111. Indeed, while streamlining empirically dubious exceptions based on the so-called reliability of
certain hearsay statements, a procedural justice paradigm could allow for many of the fairness-based
exceptions found in Federal Rule of Evidence 804 to remain intact.
112. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
113. See, e.g., Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional
Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665 (1986); Park, supra note 22; Swift, supra note 22.
114. See Ilya Somin, A Floor, Not a Ceiling: Federalism and Remedies for Violations of Constitu-
tional Rights in Danforth v. Minnesota, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 365, 365 (2008) (“Few doubt
that states can provide greater protection for individual rights under state constitutions than is available
under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Constitution.”).
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reasoning in its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence could be applicable to civil
trials as well.
A procedural justice rationale for excluding hearsay evidence would thus
have dual advantages. It would eliminate many of the reliability exceptions that
lack scientific support while potentially allowing many of the exceptions de-
signed to promote equity concerns to remain. It would also harmonize the
disparate treatment of testimonial hearsay in criminal and civil trials. A proce-
dural justice rationale will also likely lead to greater popular acceptance and
perceived legitimacy of the hearsay rule. Two experiments designed to test this
proposition are discussed below.
C. POPULAR LEGITIMACY
A procedural justice rationale for the hearsay rule has empirical support from
social science research and would lead to a more coherent and streamlined
doctrine. Past empirical research also suggests that basing the hearsay rule on
procedural justice concerns may lead to a rule that the public views as more
legitimate.115 Indeed, legal scholars have frequently argued that substantive
legal doctrines should align more closely with popular conceptions of those
doctrines.116
No one has examined empirically whether laypeople support or oppose the
use of hearsay evidence. Moreover, no one has examined the reasons for which
laypeople may oppose hearsay evidence, even though such data could affect not
only the direction of future hearsay scholarship, but also the direction of hearsay
policy itself. Two original studies reported here provide empirical evidence that
laypeople conceive the hearsay rule as one that protects the dignity interests of
litigants and not the accuracy of legal decisions.117
The first study examines whether laypeople’s satisfaction with a dispute
resolution proceeding is a function of the degree to which the proceeding
includes hearsay evidence. If, consistent with psychological research on proce-
115. See generally THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 24 (premising their book on the notion that
concerns about the process by which disputes are litigated have an effect on people’s attitudes toward
the decision maker); TYLER, supra note 24 (same).
116. See, e.g., Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the
Exclusionary Rule, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 149, 154–66 (2012) (empirically testing two competing
rationales for the exclusionary rule, determining that laypeople support the integrity justification, and
arguing that the Supreme Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence should align with this justification);
Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Daniel M. Bartels, Competing Theories of Blackmail: An
Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX. L. REV. 291, 313–34, 346 (2010)
(examining competing theories of blackmail to determine which has the most popular support and
recommending that the law align with the public’s understanding of the crime).
117. These studies are substantially in the form of a controlled laboratory experiment, in which the
experimental variable of interest is manipulated, whereas all other aspects of the experiment remain the
same in every experimental condition. The controlled laboratory experiment is the best way to make
statements of causality with respect to the manipulated variables, but experiments also come with
significant tradeoffs with respect to ecological validity. For a robust discussion of these issues, see infra
Part V.B.
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dural justice, participants’ discomfort with hearsay evidence is a function of the
dignity interest of the defendant—and not the effect of hearsay evidence on the
risk of inaccurate verdicts—this provides empirical support for the proposition
that a streamlined hearsay rule that focuses on procedural justice, and not
decisional accuracy, will receive greater popular legitimacy insofar as it more
closely aligns with popular conceptions of the purpose of the hearsay rule.
The second study extends the empirical analysis reported in the first study by
examining participants’ spontaneous responses to two trials that either contain,
or do not contain, hearsay evidence. If participants are dissatisfied with hearsay
evidence, and their direct responses to questions posed to them specifically
reference procedural justice concerns instead of decisional accuracy concerns,
the second study provides even greater evidence that a procedural justice
rationale for the hearsay rule is likely to receive greater popular legitimacy.
III. STUDY 1
The first study reported in this Article tests the assertion that laypeople will
be less satisfied with a dispute resolution proceeding that contains hearsay
evidence compared to a proceeding in which the evidence is presented as direct
testimony by a live witness. Moreover, it will assess whether any dissatisfaction
laypeople may experience with hearsay evidence is because hearsay evidence
raises the risk of inaccurate decisions or because hearsay evidence is offensive
to the dignity interest of the defendant. The study will also examine whether
this hypothesized discomfort—and the psychological mechanism that underlies
it—exists in different types of dispute resolution proceedings.
If participants dislike hearsay evidence, as suggested by the empirical re-
search to date,118 we would expect lower ratings of satisfaction for trials that
contain hearsay evidence compared to those that contain a live witness who is
subjected to cross-examination. But Study 1 contains an additional version of a
trial, in which the witness appears live, but the witness is not subjected to
cross-examination. Thus, the only difference between this version of the trial
and the version that contains hearsay evidence is the in-court presence of the
witness; the witness otherwise provides exactly the same information to the
tribunal in both versions of the trial. If participants believe that the hearsay rule
prevents erroneous verdicts, we would expect them to be just as dissatisfied
with this additional condition, because the witness’s mere presence—without
being exposed to the crucible of cross-examination—should not advance this
accuracy goal.119 But if participants believe that the hearsay rule serves a
118. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing experiments that suggest that jurors give
hearsay evidence less probative weight than they give other types of evidence).
119. Astute readers may wonder, however, whether participants in this experimental condition would
simply trust that the court is exercising all of its procedural safeguards when a witness appears live. In
other words, even though these particular witnesses are not subject to cross-examination, perhaps the
participants would believe that there is a good reason for the lack of cross-examination (and so their
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dignity interest—by forcing accusers to look the accused in the proverbial
eye—then we might expect jurors to be more satisfied with this additional
condition, even though the witness was not subject to cross-examination. The
figure below illustrates the different predictions based on these differing policy
goals.
It is possible, however, that participants believe that the hearsay rule safe-
guards decisional accuracy, and that the mere presence of the witness (without
cross-examination) still furthers this goal, because the tribunal may be able to
assess the witness’s demeanor.120 To distinguish such a rationale from partici-
pants who may believe that the witness’s presence serves a dignity function,
participants will also be asked the degree to which they believe the trial is fair to
the defendant, and the degree to which they believe the tribunal will be able to
reach an accurate verdict. Participants’ responses can then be compared to their
satisfaction ratings to determine which rationale better accounts for those
ratings. For example, if a concern over decisional accuracy drives participants’
judgments of satisfaction with the trial, we would expect results that approxi-
mate the left side of Figure 3, in which the mere production of the witness has
little to no effect on the accuracy of the tribunal’s decision. If, however, a
concern for procedural justice and the dignity interest of the defendant drives
their satisfaction judgments, we would expect a pattern of results similar to
accuracy concerns are allayed because they trust the court is doing its job correctly). This is a credible
alternative hypothesis for the no-cross experimental condition, and so we might expect that perceptions
of accuracy in this condition would be similar to the cross condition instead of the hearsay condition in
Figure 3.
120. Such beliefs are misplaced. See, e.g., Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a
Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 913, 920 (1991) (arguing, with empirical evidence, that laypeople are
unskilled at assessing the credibility of others); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J.
Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787 (2001) (finding that even professional
legal decision makers are subject to mistakes of reasoning and impression formation).
Figure 3: Hypothesized Satisfaction Reported in the Mock Trial by
Experimental Condition
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those on the right side of Figure 3. Specifically, we would expect that the mere
production of the witness will increase participants’ satisfaction with the trial.121
A. PARTICIPANTS
Three hundred twenty-one participants were recruited for an online study
using the web-recruiting service Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), which has
been shown empirically to be an inexpensive way to collect quality data from
persons who are representative of the general Internet-using population.122 The
sample of participants in this study was 45.80% female, 72.50% Caucasian, and
averaged 35.73 years of age (with a standard deviation of 12.21 years). Approxi-
mately 89.40% of participants in the sample had completed at least a college
degree, and the median household income of the sample was between $40,000
and $49,999.
B. PROCEDURE AND MEASURES
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions in
the study. Specifically, participants were assigned to an experimental condition
that contained one type of dispute resolution procedure and one type of key
evidence. The dispute resolution mechanism to which participants were exposed
included either a criminal trial or a quasi-administrative hearing. The key
evidence against the accused consisted of (1) a hearsay statement, (2) a live
witness who was not subject to cross-examination, or (3) a live witness who
was subject to cross-examination. The dispute resolution mechanism to which
participants were exposed and the primary evidence against the accused were
randomly assigned to each participant.123
Participants then read a set of written materials. Half the participants read a
vignette depicting a criminal conspiracy trial, and half the participants read a
vignette depicting an internal dispute resolution procedure at a major corpora-
tion. In the criminal conspiracy trial, the defendant was accused of conspiring
with a coworker to assassinate a state senator. The State alleged that the
defendant, who had a vendetta against the senator, approached the coworker at
the senator’s town hall meeting and eventually formed a plan to purchase a rifle,
121. If neither decisional accuracy nor procedural justice drives participants’ satisfaction with the
trial, we would expect no relationship between each rationale and participants’ satisfaction judgments.
If both concerns drive their satisfaction judgments, we should see the same pattern of results for
satisfaction, decisional accuracy, and fairness across the different experimental conditions.
122. See, e.g., Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online Labor
Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 366
(2012); Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New
Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 3, 5 (2011); Winter
Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV.
RES. METHODS 1, 2–4 (2012).
123. The number of experimental conditions can be calculated by multiplying together the number
of hearing types (two) by the number of evidence conditions (three), which totals six different
conditions.
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which the defendant would use to shoot the senator. The defendant was then
tried for conspiracy to commit murder.
In the corporation’s internal dispute resolution proceeding, the defendant was
accused of conspiring with a coworker to get his boss fired, whom he strongly
disliked. The company alleged that the defendant approached the coworker and
formed a plan in which the defendant would purchase drugs and plant them in
his boss’s office. The authorities would then be called to investigate. In all
variations of the dispute, the coworker confessed to his involvement in the
alleged conspiracy and implicated the defendant. The defendant was then the
subject of an internal dispute resolution proceeding, in which he would be
terminated from the company if he were found to have committed the acts of
which he was accused.
In both disputes, information from the coworker consisted of one of three
forms. The coworker either: (1) provided a lengthy written confession of the
conspiracy, read into the record by the State (or the corporation), in which he
implicated the defendant; (2) testified live in the hearing to these same facts and
was not cross-examined; or (3) testified live in the hearing to these same facts
but was cross-examined. Every other aspect of each dispute remained exactly
the same, regardless of the experimental condition to which the participant was
assigned. After reading closing arguments by each party, participants were told
that the fact finder began its deliberation.
Participants were not informed of the fact finder’s verdict and were instead
asked several questions regarding what they had read. First, I asked questions
designed to gauge the degree to which participants had paid attention to the
dispute resolution proceeding to which they had been exposed. For example,
participants were asked questions regarding the type of evidence that was used
against the defendant, the nature of the charges against him, and the form of the
evidence against him. Participants could not continue the experiment unless
they answered these questions correctly.124
Next, participants were asked a series of questions designed to assess their
general attitudes regarding the dispute resolution procedure. They were asked to
rate, on a scale ranging from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied), how
satisfied they were with the dispute resolution proceeding. They were also asked
to rate, on similar seven-point scales, the degree to which the dispute resolution
proceeding would produce an accurate verdict and the extent to which it would
124. At this time, there is no way to ascertain on MTurk how many participants answered the
comprehension questions correctly on their first attempt. There is, however, circumstantial evidence to
suggest that nearly all participants answered the comprehension questions accurately on their first
attempt, and that most participants simply did not guess randomly until they were able to advance in the
study. The survey software does collect data with respect to the amount of time that participants spent
on the page of the study that contained the comprehension questions, and an examination of that data
suggests that most participants spent roughly the same amount of time answering the questions.
Because the comprehension items consisted of several multiple-choice questions, random guessing
should have caused those participants to spend considerably more time answering the questions
correctly.
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produce a fair or just verdict. Afterward, participants answered how satisfied
they were with the dispute resolution procedure in a dichotomous form: that
they were satisfied or unsatisfied.
I then assessed each participant’s impressions of the evidence presented to
them. For example, they were asked to rate how satisfied they were with the
coworker’s information (either in its confession form or in its live-testimony
form), as well as how fair or just the inclusion of that testimony was and how
likely it was to help the court reach an accurate verdict. Each of these questions
required participants to answer on a seven-point scale, with more negative
views anchored at 1 and more positive views anchored at 7.
After completing these questions, participants were asked to provide demo-
graphic information, including their age, race, income, level of education
completed, and their familiarity with the legal system. Participants were then
debriefed with respect to the aims of the study, and the experiment was concluded.
C. RESULTS
This analysis examines the effect of the type of hearing and the hearsay
manipulation on participants’ attitudes about the trial. I conducted an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) to determine whether the type of hearing, the hearsay
manipulation, or a combination of these two variables affected participants’
satisfaction with the trial, perceptions of its fairness, and perceptions of its
ability to render a factually accurate verdict.125
1. Satisfaction
I first analyzed the data provided by the study participants with respect to
their scaled ratings of satisfaction. As predicted, the ANOVA revealed two
125. Specifically, I conducted a two (hearing type: administrative vs. criminal) x three (type of
hearsay: confession vs. live witness with no cross-examination vs. live witness with cross-examination)
ANOVA on participants’ satisfaction with the trial. I then conducted the same ANOVA on participants’
perceptions of the fairness of the trial and on their perceptions of the ability of the court to render an
accurate factual decision.
An analysis of variance provides a statistical test of whether the means of several groups are equal.
ANOVA results are represented by an F-statistic, and the sizes of the effects are represented by 2p.
Means are denoted by the letter “M” and standard deviations are denoted by the letters “SD.” See
ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 277–85 (2010) (explaining empirical research
methodologies and statistical techniques).
Differences are denoted as “statistically significant” in this Article if the statistical tests indicate that
the likelihood that the difference observed would occur by chance is 5% or less (as indicated by the
p-value as p  0.05). A difference is “marginally significant” if the likelihood of seeing such a
difference by chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and
Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 485 n.117 (2003) (citing BARBARA
G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 1989)). Planned comparisons
were accompanied by the Tukey HSD Test to stabilize the “experimentwise error rate” and avoid false
positives. See, e.g., James Jaccard, Michael A. Becker & Gregory Wood, Pairwise Multiple Compari-
son Procedures: A Review, 96 PSYCHOL. BULL. 589, 594–95 (1984) (discussing several techniques,
including the Tukey technique, for controlling Type I error when making multiple comparisons among
groups).
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statistically significant findings. First, the analysis revealed a significant finding
based on the type of hearing, such that participants were more satisfied, on
average, with the quasi-administrative hearing than with the criminal trial.126
Second (and more importantly), the analysis revealed that the type of hearsay
evidence affected participants’ satisfaction with the trial. Specifically, partici-
pants were the least satisfied when the evidence against the defendant was in the
form of the written confession, more satisfied when that evidence was presented
in the form of a live witness who was not cross-examined, and the most satisfied
when that evidence was presented in the form of a live witness subject to
cross-examination.127
To determine whether participants’ satisfaction with the criminal trial or the
administrative hearing was the result of a linear relationship among the hearsay
confession, live witness (with no cross-examination), and live witness (with
cross-examination) versions of the procedure to which they were exposed—and
which is suggested by the graphs in the figure above—I employed a statistical
126. Mcriminal  4.48 (SD  1.90), Madministrative  5.02 (SD  1.86); F(1, 315)  8.13, p  .005,
2p  .03.
127. Mhearsay  4.33 (SD  1.94), Mno-cross  4.73 (SD  1.77); Mcross  5.15 (SD  1.93); F(2,
315)  5.90, p  .003, 2p  .04. This pattern occurred regardless of the type of hearing (the relative
averages were simply lower across the board in all three criminal trial conditions compared to the three
administrative trial conditions). Further, there was no interaction between the type of hearing to which
participants were exposed and the type of hearsay evidence presented, F(2, 315) 0.55, p .576.
Although the difference in satisfaction between the administrative hearing and the trial condition is
intriguing, the remaining analyses—examining the role of decisional accuracy and procedural fairness
in explaining participants’ ratings of satisfaction—will average the administrative hearing and trial
conditions together for simplicity. Full results separated by hearing condition are on file with the author.
Figure 4: Ratings of Satisfaction with the Tribunal in an Administrative
and Trial Setting
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technique called a contrast analysis.128 As predicted, the contrast analysis
revealed a statistically significant linear pattern consistent with the study’s
hypothesis. Specifically, as the evidence presented to the participants changed
from an out-of-court hearsay confession, to the same confession repeated in
court by that statement’s author, to a live cross-examination of the confessor,
participants became more satisfied with both the criminal trial and the adminis-
trative hearing.129
I found similar results when I examined participants’ dichotomous ratings of
satisfaction, in which participants selected whether they were generally satisfied
or generally dissatisfied with the dispute resolution procedure to which they
were exposed.130 The results revealed a statistically significant effect of the type
of hearsay exposed to participants. Compared to the hearsay confession condition,
participants exposed to the live witness (with no cross-examination) were two
times more likely to express satisfaction, and participants exposed to the live
witness who was cross-examined were three times more likely to express
satisfaction than were participants who were exposed to the hearsay confession.
2. Fairness
I conducted the same analysis with respect to participants’ perceptions of the
perceived fairness of the hearing to which they were exposed. Again (and as
predicted), the ANOVA revealed that the hearsay condition affected partici-
pants’ judgments of fairness, such that participants’ perceptions of the fairness
to the accused were lowest in the hearsay confession condition, higher in the
live witness (no cross-examination) condition, and highest in the live witness
(with cross-examination) condition.131 As predicted, a contrast analysis revealed
a meaningful linear pattern in the perceptions of fairness for participants
exposed to the administrative hearing and those exposed to the criminal trial; as
the procedure allowed the defendant more control over the trial, participants’
perceptions of the fairness of the procedure gradually increased.132
128. A contrast analysis determines whether a statistically significant linear pattern exists within the
data. Whereas an ANOVA allows researchers to determine whether any of the means for several
different groups are different, a contrast analysis allows researchers to test more specific hypotheses, for
example, whether the means show a specific polynomial pattern, such as a linear, cubic, or quadratic
function. In sum, a contrast analysis tests a specific question about the pattern of results revealed in an
ANOVA. See, e.g., Contrast Analysis, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RESEARCH DESIGN 243, 243–44 (Neil J.
Salkind ed., 2010).
129. F(1, 318) 9.90, p .002.
130. To examine this question, I used a statistical technique referred to as a logistic regression
analysis. A multiple regression analysis is a statistical test that estimates the independent effects of
several predictor variables on a continuous dependent variable. A logistic regression is a regression
analysis that examines whether several variables independently predict a binary, dichotomous outcome,
such as being satisfied or unsatisfied. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 125, at 343–50.
131. Mcriminal  4.13 (SD  1.88), Mno-cross  4.55 (SD  1.74), Mcross-examination  5.16 (SD  1.88);
F(2, 314) 10.38, p .001, 2p  .06.
132. F(2, 317) 16.50, p .001.
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3. Accuracy
If participants’ antipathy toward hearsay evidence is primarily a function of
the unfairness of presenting hearsay evidence instead of its potential lack of
accuracy, we would expect a different pattern of results with respect to partici-
pants’ perceptions of the fact finder’s ability to reach an accurate verdict. This
hypothesis was tested first with an ANOVA, which revealed a statistically
significant effect of the type of hearsay presented to the defendant.133
An ANOVA, however, reveals only whether any of the means in the experi-
mental conditions differ from each other. A contrast analysis determines whether
the means form a linear pattern. Unlike participants’ satisfaction ratings and
fairness judgments, a linear contrast analysis of participants’ perceptions of
decisional accuracy revealed no linear pattern in Figure 6,134 and a further
analysis indicated that the means in the hearsay confession and live witness (no
cross-examination) conditions were not different from each other, whereas the
live witness (with cross-examination) condition produced greater perceptions of
the decisional accuracy of the administrative hearing and the criminal tribu-
nal.135 In sum, producing a witness did not alter participants’ perceptions of
decisional accuracy; therefore a belief that the mere presence of a witness might
allow for a fact finder to evaluate that witness’ demeanor is unsupported by the
data.136
133. Mhearsay  4.41 (SD  1.81), Mno-cross  4.55 (SD  1.67), Mcross-examination  5.35 (SD  1.89);
F(1, 315) 9.87, p .001, 2p  .06.
134. F(1, 318) 2.49, p .115.
135. For the comparison of the hearsay condition to the no-cross-examination condition, p  .576;
for the comparison of the no-cross-examination condition to the cross-examination condition, p  .001.
136. A mediation analysis, performed below in Part III.C.4, confirms this result.
Figure 5: Perceptions of the Fairness of the Procedure Employed in
the Dispute
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4. Mediation Analysis
The experimental results so far suggest that participants’ satisfaction with the
evidence presented to them followed a linear pattern. They were least satisfied
with a hearsay confession, more satisfied with the presence of a live witness,
and most satisfied with the presence of a live witness who was subject to
cross-examination.
Figure 6: Perceptions of the Accuracy of the Procedure Employed in
the Dispute
Figure 7: Perceptions of General Satisfaction, Fairness, and Accuracy
by Condition
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As illustrated in Figure 7, the results so far also shed light on the reason why
participants prefer trials with a live witness subject to cross-examination over
trials that rely on a hearsay confession. Recall that two possibilities emerge. The
first is that tribunals in which live witnesses testify will reach more accurate
decisions because the evidence has been vetted in the adversary process.
The second is that the live witness provides the defendant with an important
dignity interest—getting to “look his accuser in the eye”—apart from decisional
accuracy.
The data so far show the participants’ satisfaction ratings and fairness ratings
exhibited a linear pattern. However, the participant’s ratings of the accuracy of
the dispute resolution procedure to which they were exposed did not exhibit a
linear pattern. This suggests that participants’ satisfaction with the proceeding to
which they were exposed was more likely to be a function of the perceived
fairness of the proceeding and not its ability to make accurate decisions.
Psychologists can test this hypothesis empirically through a procedure called a
mediation analysis.
A mediation analysis is, at its core, a series of predictive “connect-the-dots”
statistical statements.137 A statistically meaningful mediation analysis first dem-
onstrates that the predictor variable predicts the outcome variable.138 It then
demonstrates that the predictor variable also predicts a mediator variable, and
that the mediator, in turn, predicts the outcome variable.139 Finally, the media-
tion analysis demonstrates that the effect of the predictor variable on the
outcome variable is reduced or eliminated when the mediator is added to the
statistical model, which suggests that the mediator is responsible for the effect
of the predictor variable on the outcome variable.140
Under this framework, I used a mediation analysis to determine whether the
fairness of the proceeding, the accuracy of the decision, or both mediated the
effect of the type of evidence to which participants were exposed on their
satisfaction for the proceeding in which that evidence was produced. Initially, I
confirmed the results of Study 1 by examining via a regression analysis whether
the type of evidence to which participants were exposed (specifically, a hearsay
confession, a live witness who was not cross-examined, or a live witness who
withstood cross-examination) affected the participants’ satisfaction with the
137. Justin Sevier, Redesigning the Science Court, 73 MD. L. REV. 770, 824 (2014). Mediation
analysis detects “when a predictor affects a dependent variable indirectly through at least one interven-
ing variable, or mediator.” Kristopher J. Preacher & Andrew F. Hayes, Asymptotic and Resampling
Strategies for Assessing and Comparing Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models, 40 BEHAV. RES.
METHODS 879, 879 (2008). The mediation analysis reported in this Article is performed using a linear
regression analysis and reports unstandardized coefficients, “B,” and standard errors, “SE.” It also
reports a “t” statistic, which determines whether the coefficients are statistically significant. A linear
regression is a statistical test that estimates the independent effects of several predictor variables on a
continuous dependent variable. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 125, at 29, 300–31.
138. Preacher & Hayes, supra note 137, at 879; Sevier, supra note 137, at 824.
139. Preacher & Hayes, supra note 137, at 879; Sevier, supra note 137, at 824.
140. Preacher & Hayes, supra note 137, at 879; Sevier, supra note 137, at 824.
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proceedings. The analysis confirmed that a strong relationship exists between
these variables.141
Next, I examined the role of perceived fairness to the defendant in mediating
the effect of the type of evidence on participants’ satisfaction with the proceed-
ing. First, I evaluated whether the evidence to which participants were exposed
affected their perceptions of fairness, and the result was statistically signifi-
cant.142 As the evidence became less like hearsay and more like a live cross-
examination, perceptions of perceived fairness increased. Second, I examined
whether the perceived fairness of the proceeding affected participants’ judg-
ments of satisfaction. The results indicated that, to a statistically significant
degree, as perceptions of the fairness of the proceeding increased, judgments of
satisfaction increased as well.143 Altogether, the analysis confirms that the
evidence to which participants were exposed predicted their perceptions of the
fairness of the proceeding, and these perceptions of fairness, in turn, predicted
their satisfaction with the proceeding.
I then examined the role of the ability of the court to produce an accurate
verdict in mediating the effect of the type of evidence on participants’ satisfac-
tion with the proceeding. As with perceived fairness, I performed a regression
analysis to determine whether the evidence to which participants were presented
affected their perceptions of the tribunal’s ability to render an accurate verdict.
This time, and unlike the regression on participants’ perceptions of fairness, this
regression revealed no relationship between these two variables.144
As illustrated in the figure above, whereas the perceived fairness of the
proceeding was a statistically significant mediator of the effect of the evidence
on participants’ satisfaction with the proceeding—in fact, it accounts for all of
the effect of hearsay evidence on participants’ satisfaction judgments—the
perceived ability of the tribunal to render an accurate verdict given the evidence
was not a statistically significant mediator.145
141. B .408, SE 0.13, t 3.15, p .002.
142. B .516, SE 0.13, t 4.06, p .001.
143. B .787, SE 0.04, t 22.13, p .001.
144. B .473, SE 0.13, t 3.82, p .05.
145. The effect of the evidence to which participants were exposed on participants’ judgments of
satisfaction, without the perceived fairness of the evidence to the defendant, is .17, which represents a
standardized beta coefficient. When the perceived fairness of the evidence to the defendant is included
in the model, the effect of the type of evidence is reduced to nonsignificance (a -.02 beta coefficient
with a corresponding p-value above .05). Thus, the perceived fairness of the evidence to the defendant
is a full mediator of participants’ satisfaction with the proceeding. In contrast, with participants’
perception of the ability of the tribunal to reach an accurate decision, the evidence was not a
statistically significant mediator of the effect of the evidence on participants’ satisfaction judgments.
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The same results are evident when satisfaction is measured dichotomously
(that is, when participants answer that they were “generally satisfied” or “gener-
ally dissatisfied” with the dispute resolution proceeding). The table below
illustrates that, just like when satisfaction is measured on a seven-point scale,
participants’ perceptions of the evidence’s fairness to the defendant—and not
their perceptions of the ability of the court to make an accurate decision given
the evidence that was presented—fully mediated participants’ satisfaction with
the proceeding.146
D. DISCUSSION
The experimental results reported in Study 1 reveal several findings regarding
the public’s perceptions of hearsay evidence at trial. First, the degree to which
146. A logistic regression is a regression analysis that examines whether several variables indepen-
dently predict a binary, dichotomous outcome, such as a guilty or not guilty verdict. See LAWLESS ET AL.,
supra note 125, at 345–50 (discussing “logit regressions”). The odds ratio on the right side of the table
represents the odds that an individual would choose one of the binary options given the effect of the
independent variable on the left side of the graph. Thus, procedural justice fully mediated the effect of
the hearsay evidence on participants’ judgments of satisfaction, and for each one-unit increase in their
perceptions of the procedural justice of the trial, they became 36% more likely to say that they were
satisfied.
Figure 8: Mediation Analysis Examining Which Variables Mediate the
Effect of the Trial Procedure on Participants’ Feelings of Satisfaction
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participants are concerned about hearsay evidence depends, partly, on the stakes
of the dispute resolution procedure. Participants did not find hearsay to be
overly problematic generally. Rather, participants became more troubled by
hearsay evidence as the crime for which the defendant was accused—and his
potential punishment—increased. Thus, although participants in this study ap-
peared troubled by hearsay in both types of dispute resolution proceedings, they
were more troubled when the hearsay evidence was used to accuse the defen-
dant of conspiracy to commit murder than when the defendant was accused of a
lesser type of conspiracy. There could, of course, be other reasons for this
difference. For example, a courtroom jury may simply respond to hearsay
evidence differently compared to a fact finder in an administrative hearing. This
finding should therefore receive additional empirical attention.
More importantly, Study 1 sheds light on the reason for which participants
expressed dissatisfaction with trials that involved hearsay evidence. The results
suggest that, in both the criminal trial and the internal dispute proceeding,
participants were least satisfied with a proceeding that relied primarily on
hearsay evidence, more satisfied with a proceeding in which the witness ap-
peared live without cross-examination, and most satisfied with a proceeding in
which the live witness was cross-examined. If we maintain the belief that
hearsay evidence is problematic only because of its effect on the decisional
accuracy of a dispute resolution tribunal—because unreliable hearsay evidence
might be afforded greater probative weight than it deserves—the results re-
ported in Study 1 would support the view that participants are acting irratio-
nally. There would be little difference, from the perspective of decisional
accuracy, between a witness whose out-of-court statement is read into the
record and a witness who appears live to read that same statement without being
Table 1: Effect of Evidence, Procedural Justice, and Decisional Accuracy
on Satisfaction
B SE Wald p-value Odds
Hearsay Condition — — 0.43 .808 —
No Cross 0.03 0.29 0.01 .933 1.03
Cross-Examination 0.15 0.28 0.26 .610 0.87
Procedural Justice 0.31 0.11 8.55 .003 1.36
Decisional Accuracy 0.08 0.11 0.53 .465 0.93
Constant 0.91 0.41 4.99 .025 0.41
Model 2 17.29*
Pseudo R2 .170




A closer evaluation of the data suggests that participants were acting ratio-
nally. If participants’ discomfort with the hearsay evidence to which they were
exposed stems from a belief that it is unfair for out-of-court statements to be
used against the defendant—that is, that the accuser should be required to
appear in court to look the defendant in the eye—then it is rational that their
discomfort with hearsay evidence would decrease when the accuser appears live
at trial, even if the accuser provides the same information that would appear in
the out-of-court statement.
Indeed, the mediation analysis makes clear that that the underlying rationale
for participants’ discomfort with hearsay evidence stems from their view that
such evidence is unfair to the defendant, not that the evidence raises the risk of
inaccurate verdicts. Participants’ ratings of the fairness of the proceeding fol-
lowed the same linear pattern as their satisfaction with the proceeding. But their
view of the risk of an inaccurate verdict did not. Rather, participants’ perception
of the risk of an inaccurate verdict only decreased when the live witness was
subjected to cross-examination; it was static in the remaining two experimental
conditions. Thus, it is unsurprising that the mediator of participants’ dissatisfac-
tion with hearsay evidence was not decisional accuracy, but the dignity interest
of the defendant on trial.
IV. STUDY 2
Study 1 suggests that laypeople are generally averse to hearsay evidence.
Laypeople instead appear to be more satisfied with dispute resolution proce-
dures that include live witnesses who withstand adversarial cross-examination.
Study 1 also strongly suggests that laypeople do not see the legal prohibition on
hearsay evidence as a rule that primarily safeguards the tribunal’s decisional
accuracy and minimizes the risk of erroneous verdicts. Rather, Study 1 suggests
that laypeople perceive the rule against hearsay evidence as a rule that safe-
guards the dignity interests of the defendant and preserves fair play during the
dispute resolution proceeding.
Participants in Study 1, however, were not directly asked for the reasons that
underlie their discomfort with hearsay evidence. Although the mediation analy-
sis strongly suggests that procedural fairness—and not decisional accuracy—is
the primary reason for their discomfort, psychologists have methods by which
they are able to measure participants’ free responses to this question.
147. It would be an overstatement, however, to conclude that decisional accuracy is irrelevant to
participants’ satisfaction with hearsay. Although it does not explain the pattern of participants’
satisfaction levels to a significant degree generally—and not as well as participants’ perceptions of
procedural justice—participants’ levels of satisfaction and perceptions of decisional accuracy did
increase in the cross-examination condition (compared to the condition in which the witness was live
but was not cross-examined).
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Study 2 therefore seeks to replicate the results found in Study 1 while also
adding to those results in several ways. In Study 2, participants were exposed to
a summary of the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.148 This time, there were two
versions of the trial: (1) a version in which the alleged coconspirator’s evidence
against Raleigh took the form of an out-of-court hearsay confession (which is
what occurred at the trial); and (2) a version in which Raleigh’s coconspirator
testified live to the same evidence and was not exposed to cross-examination.
Thus, the same information was presented to participants and only the form of
that information varied between the two conditions.
In Study 2, however, instead of being exposed to just one version of the trial,
participants were exposed to both versions of the trial, in random order. In this
experimental design, participants were able to compare the two versions of the
Raleigh trial, decide what satisfied or dissatisfied them about those versions of
the trial, and then discuss their satisfaction or dissatisfaction in their own words
to the experimenters.
If participants dislike hearsay evidence, as the results of Study 1 suggest, then
we would expect that participants would be significantly more satisfied with the
version of the Raleigh trial in which the coconspirator testified compared to the
version in which the hearsay statement was admitted into evidence. Moreover,
we should be able to determine, in the participant’s own words, whether the
increase in perceived satisfaction is the result of perceptions of fairness or
perceptions of increased decisional accuracy.
A. PARTICIPANTS
One hundred sixty-four participants were recruited for an online study using
the web-recruiting service MTurk, which was also used in Study 1.149 The
sample of participants in this study was 53.00% female, 68.25% Caucasian, and
averaged 37.18 years of age (with a standard deviation of 14.70 years). Seventy-
one percent of the sample had completed at least a college degree, and the
average household income of the sample was between $40,000 and $49,999.
B. PROCEDURE AND MEASURES
In Study 2, participants read two variations of a summary of the trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh.150 After reading one version of the trial, participants answered
148. For a discussion of the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, see supra notes 63–66 and accompanying
text.
149. See supra note 122.
150. In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to just one experimental condition, and the
responses from different participants, who had been assigned to different experimental conditions, were
compared in a “between subjects” design. In contrast, in Study 2, each participant was exposed to both
experimental conditions and each participant’s responses to each condition were measured in a
“repeated measures” design. A repeated measures design has many benefits for statistical hypothesis
testing, which includes reducing the global variability and error in the statistical analysis, because each
participant provides data for two different experimental conditions. See, e.g., DAVID C. HOWELL,
STATISTICAL METHODS FOR PSYCHOLOGY 462 (7th ed. 2010).
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several questions. First, they answered a series of questions designed to gauge
the participants’ attention to and recollection of the trial vignette. After success-
fully answering those questions, they answered several questions designed to
gauge their satisfaction with the case, on the same seven-point scale that was
used in Study 1. Additionally, participants were asked whether they were
generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the trial.
Next, participants rated, on a seven-point scale, the degree to which they
believed that the trial was fair and the degree to which the court was able to
accurately uncover the facts of the case. Unlike in Study 1, however, partici-
pants did not answer similar questions about the individual pieces of evidence,
because the trial in Study 2 consisted solely of the statements of Raleigh’s
alleged coconspirator.151 Afterward, participants read the second variation on
the Sir Walter Raleigh trial and answered the same questions.
When participants read the trial variation that involved the hearsay confes-
sion—which was the first version for half the participants and the second
version for the other half—they were asked additional questions. If participants
responded that they were dissatisfied with the trial that contained the hearsay
confession, they were asked to type (in as many words as they preferred) the
reason for their dissatisfaction.152
After stating the reason for their dissatisfaction in their own words, partici-
pants were shown a list of potential rationales for being dissatisfied with the
trial. These rationales included: (1) that we cannot determine the accuracy of the
confession; (2) that it is unfair to the defendant for an accuser’s words to be
used against him without showing up in court; and (3) none of the above.
Participants were asked to choose the option that best encapsulated the reason
for their dissatisfaction with the trial that contained hearsay evidence. If partici-
pants chose the “none of the above” option, they were asked to type in the
reason for their dissatisfaction.
Next, participants were asked to rate, on a seven-point scale anchored at “it is
mostly about factual accuracy” on the left and “it is mostly about fairness” on
the right, the reason for which a judge would exclude the evidence. This
question was designed to measure the strength of each participant’s preference
for an “accuracy” or “fairness” rationale.
Finally, participants were asked to provide demographic information, includ-
ing their age, race, income, level of education completed, and their familiarity
The order in which participants read about the two trials was randomized. This is standard protocol in
a repeated measures design, because experimenters would otherwise raise the risk of order effects,
wherein participants’ data are systematically affected by whether they were exposed to a particular
experimental condition first or last. Randomizing the order in which participants were exposed to the different
versions of the trial eliminates potential order effects. See, e.g., Robin M. Hogarth & Hillel J. Einhorn,
Order Effects in Belief Updating: The Belief-Adjustment Model, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1 (1992).
151. In other words, to the extent that participants’ general satisfaction with the trial and their
perceptions of its fairness and accuracy are evidence-based, these could be affected only by the
information provided by the alleged coconspirator.
152. Participants’ responses were then coded in a procedure discussed more fully below.
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with the legal system. Participants were then debriefed with respect to the aims
of the study, and the experiment was concluded.
C. RESULTS
The analysis of the results in Study 2 proceeds in two parts. First, it attempts
to replicate the results found in Study 1 that (1) judgments of satisfaction will
be lower when hearsay is presented than when it is not and (2) those satisfaction
judgments are attributable to the perceived unfairness of the evidence to the
defendant and not to any perceived decisional accuracy concerns. Second, it
seeks to provide additional evidence, in the form of free-response data and
forced-choice data, that the concerns participants have with hearsay evidence
are the result of hearsay’s perceived unfairness to the defendant.
1. Two Trials
First, I examined whether statistically significant differences in perceived
satisfaction existed when participants read the summary of the Sir Walter
Raleigh trial and the coconspirator’s evidence took the form of an out-of-court
confession, or that same evidence was presented in the form of the coconspira-
tor testifying live at trial (but not subject to cross-examination). An ANOVA
revealed a significant effect of the form of the evidence, such that participants
reported higher satisfaction with the trial when the witness testified live than
when the witness’s testimony took the form of an out-of-court hearsay confession.153
153. Mhearsay  2.63 (SD  1.69), Mnon-hearsay  3.54 (SD  1.85); F(1, 159)  10.77, p  .001,
2p  .06. The same result occurred when the outcome variable was a dichotomous measure of
satisfaction (that is, satisfied or unsatisfied). A logistic regression revealed that participants were two
times more likely to be satisfied with the proceedings when the evidence was presented live than when
it was presented in the form of a hearsay statement. B  .699, SE  0.40, Wald  3.01, p  .082
(marginal).
Figure 9: Ratings of Self-Reported Satisfaction by Experimental Condition
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Next, I examined whether statistically significant differences in participants’
perceptions of the fairness to the defendant existed when the testimony against
him was presented live instead of as a hearsay statement. An ANOVA again
revealed a statistically significant effect of the form of the evidence, such that
participants perceived the trial to be fairer to the defendant when the coconspira-
tor testified live in court than when the coconspirator’s information was con-
veyed in a hearsay statement.154
I then performed this same analysis with respect to participants’ perceptions
of the tribunal’s ability to reach an accurate decision. This time, however, the
ANOVA revealed no effect of the form of the evidence. Participants perceived
no difference in the ability of the court to reach an accurate verdict when the
witness’s testimony was presented live (without cross-examination) instead of
when it was presented as an out-of-court hearsay statement.155 A side-by-side
comparison of the results presented thus far is presented in Figure 10.
Next, as in Study 1, I conducted a mediation analysis to determine whether
the differences in participants’ perceptions of the fairness of the trial affected
their satisfaction with it. Recall that Figures 9 and 10 revealed that the form of
the evidence predicted participants’ satisfaction with the evidence and the
participants’ perceptions of the fairness of the trial to the defendant. A mediation
analysis further reveals that participants’ perceptions of the fairness of the trial
predicted their satisfaction with the trial, such that perceptions of greater
fairness to the defendant were associated with higher satisfaction with the
trial.156
In contrast, the results reported in Figure 9 have already established that
perceptions of the tribunal’s ability to produce an accurate verdict were not
154. Mhearsay  3.00 (SD  1.53), Mnon-hearsay  3.54 (SD  1.85); F(1, 159)  4.10, p  .044, 2p 
.03.
155. Mhearsay  2.63 (SD  1.69), Mnon-hearsay  2.85 (SD  1.70); F(1, 159)  1.42, p  .236, 2p 
.01.
156. B .958, SE 0.04, t 26.04, p .001.
Figure 10: Ratings of the Fairness and Accuracy of the Proceedings by
Experimental Condition
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associated with the form of the evidence, although higher perceptions of
accuracy were generally associated with greater satisfaction.157 Thus, partici-
pants’ perception of the tribunal’s ability to produce accurate verdicts is elimi-
nated as a potential mediator for the effect of the form of the evidence on
participants’ satisfaction with the trial.
Finally, an evaluation of a regression model that includes the form of the
evidence and perceptions of fairness to the defendant as predictor variables, and
the seven-point scale representing participants’ satisfaction with the trial as the
dependent variable, shows that perceptions of fairness significantly mediated
the effect of the form of the evidence on participants’ satisfaction with the
trial.158
2. In Their Own Words
As reported in the previous section, the proportion of satisfied and dissatisfied
participants was significantly different across the different versions of the trial.
Specifically, although participants were generally more dissatisfied than satis-
fied with both versions of the trial, a meaningfully greater proportion of
participants were dissatisfied in the hearsay version of the trial than in the
nonhearsay version.159 Figure 11 below illustrates the percentage of participants
157. B .822, SE 0.05, t 15.78, p .001.
158. When the perceived fairness of the evidence to the defendant is included in the model, the
effect of the type of evidence is reduced from .252 to .118, which is a 53% reduction. Thus, the
perceived fairness of the evidence to the defendant accounted for 53% of the variability in participants’
judgments of satisfaction with the proceeding. In contrast, participants’ perception of the ability of the
tribunal to reach an accurate decision given the evidence was not a statistically significant mediator of
the effect of the evidence on participants’ satisfaction judgments. Moreover, when the outcome variable
is, instead, participants’ dichotomous satisfaction choice, the same result is revealed. First, participants’
dichotomous satisfaction choice is highly correlated with their scaled satisfaction scores, r(160)  .69,
p  .001. More importantly, when perceptions of procedural justice are added to the model as a
mediator, the effect of the hearsay condition is reduced to nonsignificance, and increases in the
perceived procedural justice made participants four times more likely to be dissatisfied with the trial
that contained hearsay evidence. Decisional accuracy, in contrast, did not mediate the effect. The
logistic regression table is presented below:
B SE Wald p-value Odds
Hearsay 0.96 0.67 2.04 .153 0.38
Procedural Justice 1.65 0.37 19.94 <.001 5.19
Decisional Accuracy 0.36 0.33 1.17 .279 1.43
Constant 8.19 1.70 23.29 .001 0.00
Model 2 98.01*
Pseudo R2 .722
Note: Responses were coded as 0 for unsatisfied. * indicates p .001 with respect to model fit.
159. B .699, SE 0.40, Wald 3.01, p .082 (marginal).
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who were dissatisfied or satisfied by both versions of the trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh:
To the extent that participants were unhappy with the version of the Raleigh
trial that contained hearsay evidence—which reflects the participants in the far
left bar in the figure above—Study 2 asked them specific questions designed to
understand the reason for their unhappiness. Thus, Study 2 attempted to elicit,
in the participants’ own words, the mediator (or mediators) of their unhappiness
with the Sir Walter Raleigh trial.
Participants’ responses to the free-response items were evaluated through a
procedure called a priori theme coding. Theme coding involves creating distinct
categories for each participant’s response to questions and determining the
distinct words or phrases that, holistically, would cause a participant’s response
to fall into one distinct category.160 The coding scheme for each particular
category is then created, and two coders, who do not know the experimental
hypothesis, evaluate each participant’s response and assign it to one of the
categories.161
Study 2 utilized four categories of responses: (1) a response that implicates
decisional accuracy; (2) a response that implicates fairness to the defendant; (3)
a response that implicates both decisional accuracy and fairness; and (4) a
response that implicates neither of these phenomena.
160. For a thorough review of content analysis, see Steve Stemler, An Overview of Content Analysis,
7 PRAC. ASSESSMENT, RES. & EVALUATION 17 (2001), http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v7&n17.
161. If the responses require it, the experimenters can adjust the coding scheme to include additional
categories, and the process occurs again. See id. Theme coding invariably involves a degree of
subjectivity, insofar as coders make holistic judgments about how to interpret a participant’s written
response. See id. The subjectivity is minimized, however, by requiring independent coders to code all of
the data separately. To the extent that the independent coders agree on how to classify each participant’s
response, this serves as convergent evidence that the classification is justified.
Figure 11: Percentage of Satisfied and Dissatisfied Participants
by Condition
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Responses were coded as implicating decisional accuracy if they used certain
dictionary terms that are related to accuracy or truth.162 They were coded as
implicating procedural justice if they used dictionary terms related to fairness or
justice.163 Responses that listed both decisional accuracy and procedural justice
(or equally) were marked as implicating both truth and justice, and responses
that did not list any of these terms were marked as implicating neither. These
responses were then re-evaluated to determine whether they implicated another
relevant psychological construct. A sample of participants’ responses—and how
they were coded—appears in the table below:
Moreover, as the figure below illustrates, 21% of the responses from partici-
162. These terms were based off a scale used in another work by the author and included “fact,”
“certainty,” “reality,” “actuality,” “veracity,” “verity,” “accuracy,” “honesty,” “genuineness,” “preci-
sion,” or “exactness.” See Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accu-
racy and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 212, 214 (2014). Responses were also coded as implicating decisional accuracy if they included
phrases such as “accurate decisions,” “correct decisions,” “correct answers,” “to get at the truth,” “to
find out what really happened,” “to uncover the truth,” “to determine who is right and who is wrong,”
“to get at the facts,” “to reveal the right information,” “to make a good factual decision,” or “to resolve
disputes correctly.” See id.
163. These included terms such as “fairness,” “impartiality,” “righteousness,” “reasonableness,”
“evenhandedness,” “integrity,” “uprightness,” “rightness,” or “just.” Responses were also coded as
implicating fairness to the defendant if they included phrases such as “to provide justice,” “to give
people a fair trial,” “to give people control over their fate,” “to allow people to present their
arguments,” “to allow people to make their points to a neutral (or unbiased) party,” “to protect people’s
rights,” “to give people dignity or respect,” “to get a fair result,” “to create a compromise that the
parties can live with,” or “to punish people appropriately.” See id.
Table 2: Participants’ Explanation for Dissatisfaction with the Trial
Sample “Accuracy” Responses Sample “Justice” Responses
“If we can’t see the guy, how do we know
if he’s telling the truth?”
“It’s unfair for the defendant not to be able
to see the witness in court.”
“The jury might make the wrong decision
unless we see the man who wrote the
confession.”
“It just seems wrong to me that someone
can be convicted without the person
accusing them showing up in court.”
“If we want to figure out what actually
happened, the person who conspired
with him has to show up, too.”
“I think the court is violating the rights of
the defendant by not forcing the other
person to appear in court.”
“Cross-examination is necessary to see if
the other guy’s story makes sense or
not.”
“We have fair trials in this country, which
means we don’t let people make
unfounded accusations against us.”
“You have to hear from everyone involved
if you want to make the right decision in
the case, I’d think.”
“The Constitution requires prosecutors to
give defendants a chance to see the
people being used to put them away.”
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pants who were unhappy with the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh could be catego-
rized as implicating either the decisional inaccuracy associated with hearsay
evidence or unfairness to the defendant. But consistent with the statistical
results reported in Study 1 and Study 2, participants’ free responses indicate that
79% of participants stated their unhappiness in terms of the fairness to the
defendant.164
D. DISCUSSION
Study 2 yields several findings that enhance our understanding of how the
public evaluates hearsay evidence and the reasons that underlie these evalua-
tions. First, Study 2 replicates the results reported in Study 1. When participants
were exposed to two different versions of the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, they
were significantly more satisfied with the version of the trial in which Raleigh’s
coconspirator testified live (without being cross-examined) compared to the
version in which the coconspirator’s evidence took the form of an out-of-court
164. The free response items converge with other measures used in Study 2 to assess the phenomena
that mediate participants’ disapproval of hearsay evidence. When asked to choose between a decisional
accuracy rationale and a procedural justice rationale for their dissatisfaction with the trial that involved
hearsay, the majority of participants chose the fairness rationale (with 70% choosing procedural justice
and 30% choosing decisional accuracy).
Moreover, when participants had to choose, on a six-point scale with no midpoint, which rationale
most closely expressed their dislike for the hearsay evidence (anchored at 1  decisional accuracy and
8  procedural justice), the average response was fairness-oriented and not accuracy-oriented (M 
4.84, SD 1.75).
Figure 12: Percentage of Dissatisfied Participants Discussing Accuracy or
Justice Concerns
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hearsay statement. This is so even though exactly the same information was
conveyed in both trials, and the probative value of the evidence did not change.
As in Study 1, if we focus solely on hearsay as a doctrine that promotes
decisional accuracy, participants’ greater satisfaction with a trial in which there
is no increase in the probative value of the information provided to the tribunal
appears puzzling. However, Study 2 also reveals that participants’ perception of
the court’s ability to produce an accurate decision was statistically the same in
the hearsay version of the trial as in the nonhearsay version, which suggests that
participants understand that the probative value of the evidence is unchanged.
Thus, it does not appear to be true that participants prefer live witnesses to
ensure decisional accuracy. Instead, as in Study 1, the results from Study 2
suggest that the increase in satisfaction that participants felt when they were
exposed to the version of the trial in which the witness testified was attributable
to their perception that this type of trial is more fair to the defendant than a trial
in which an out-of-court witness accuses the defendant without testifying in
person.
Moreover, participants in Study 2 explicitly confirmed this proposition in
their own words. When participants were asked why they were dissatisfied with
the Raleigh trial that contained hearsay evidence, the vast majority of partici-
pants stated that the reason for their discomfort with hearsay evidence involves
procedural justice concerns.165 In sum, these participants believed that accusa-
tory witnesses should testify in-person at trial, not because doing so would
reduce the risk of inaccurate verdicts, but because the defendant has a dignity
interest in being convicted by the testimony of a witness who will look him in
the proverbial eye.
V. IMPLICATIONS, OBJECTIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
The most important, and unanswered, empirical query with respect to hearsay
evidence is to determine what values the public believes the hearsay rule is
designed to protect. The primary rationale for the rule barring hearsay evidence
focuses on the extent to which barring potentially unreliable evidence decreases
the risk of inaccurate judicial fact-finding. The difficulty with this rationale is
two-fold, however. First, the empirical research conducted to date suggests that
the detrimental effects of hearsay evidence on the decisional accuracy of a
decision-making body might be a figment of rule makers’ collective imagina-
tion. Instead, the social-science evidence suggests that jurors are far more likely
to discount hearsay compared to other types of evidence because they appar-
165. Most participant responses were classified as implicating accuracy or justice concerns by the
independent coders. Any disagreements were resolved through discussion, and the results reported here
reflect postdiscussion classifications. These results align with empirical work that suggests that,
although laypeople do perceive a relationship between accuracy and justice—insofar as one may
incorporate the other—they also perceive them as distinct concepts. See Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier,
How Do the Courts Create Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly,
and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1095, 1095–98 (2014).
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ently recognize that hearsay evidence is subject to several types of testimonial
infirmities.166
A procedural justice rationale for the hearsay rule will have the support of the
general public because dignity and fairness concerns—and not decisional accu-
racy concerns—are what the vast majority of the public believes the hearsay
rule is designed to protect. Two original experiments reported in this Article
have provided the first empirical support for the proposition that conceiving of
the rule barring hearsay evidence as protecting the dignity concerns of litigants
is likely to lead to greater popular legitimacy for the rule. The first study found
that, in criminal and noncriminal contexts, participants were far less satisfied
with the trial proceeding when hearsay evidence was present, and that their
satisfaction was specifically tied, not to the ability of the tribunal to determine
the truth of the matter given the evidence, but to their perception that the
inclusion of that evidence was unfair to the defendant. This finding was
confirmed in the second study, in which participants’ candid responses of
dissatisfaction with the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh overwhelmingly suggested
that their dissatisfaction with the hearsay evidence was process-based. The vast
majority of participants were dissatisfied with Raleigh’s trial because the use of
the hearsay confession to convict him seemed unseemly to participants; their
dissatisfaction was not tied to any effects that the confession might have on the
tribunal’s ability to reach the correct substantive outcome.
Taken together, these studies provide support for the growing weight of
empirical data challenging the appropriateness of relying on a decisional accu-
racy rationale to support the ban on hearsay evidence. The results also have
implications for the future direction of the hearsay rule and for ground-level
decisions that practicing attorneys make daily with respect to hearsay evidence.
A. RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the decisional accuracy rationale for
the hearsay rule is crumbling under the weight of empirical research. Empirical
hearsay studies continue to converge on the same conclusion: jurors are signifi-
cantly more competent to evaluate hearsay evidence than policymakers credit
them to be.167 In stark contrast, the procedural justice rationale for the rule
166. Moreover, a preoccupation with the potentially detrimental effects of hearsay on legal decision
making can lead to empirical questions that are incapable of a satisfactory answer. To the extent that we
fashion the hearsay doctrine according to a concern that jurors do not afford hearsay evidence exactly
the probative weight that hearsay deserves raises the question of how to assign probative weight to
evidence that is presented at trial at all. Because there exists no clear, objective standard by which
judicial fact finders weigh the evidence that is presented to them at a legal proceeding, the proposition
that hearsay evidence will not be discounted appropriately enough by judicial decision makers is
unfalsifiable and counterproductive to creating coherent, evidence-based hearsay policy.
167. See supra Part II.C. It is, however, an open question—and one worth further empirical
study—whether jurors are actually competent or whether they are simply more competent than we
expect. As discussed earlier in this Article, a measurement problem exists that currently prevents us
from further exploring which is the more accurate phrase.
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barring hearsay evidence has significant support in both the theoretical literature
and in empirical, social psychological studies.168
The implications for the hearsay doctrine are numerous. If jurors are compe-
tent to evaluate hearsay evidence, the decisional accuracy rationale for the
hearsay rule must give way to a more persuasive justification. Some researchers
have argued, based on the empirical data, that hearsay evidence should be
allowed into court because hearsay often contains at least some informational
value and jurors can be trusted to discount hearsay in a reasonable manner.169 It
is not obvious, however, that the solution is to eliminate the hearsay rule.
Eliminating the hearsay rule altogether is likely to create greater cost to the
legal system and to litigants than keeping the rule, but relying on a rationale that
is theoretically coherent and empirically credible.
If we conceive of the hearsay rule as a rule that promotes fairness in the trial
process—which the studies reported in this Article suggest is how the public
conceives of the doctrine—we might argue that, as a matter of dignity, criminal
and civil trial judges should not allow into evidence information from accusers
whom the defendant has not had the opportunity to face and to cross-
examine.170 Hearsay policy that relies on principles that underlie the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause (and its state-law counterparts) shifts the
normative debate from one that is almost entirely empirically based to one that
is based both on empirical testing and sound psychological theory.
A procedural justice rationale would also more closely align with recent
constitutional developments with respect to the hearsay doctrine. Although the
controlling rationale for the U.S. Supreme Court’s hearsay jurisprudence has
become less predictable recently, its decisions in Crawford v. Washington171 and
Davis v. Washington172 signal that the Supreme Court finds this procedural
justice rationale appealing, although the Court also appears to be focused, in
part, on empirical assertions about the power of cross-examination to expose
testimonial infirmities.173
A shift to a procedural justice justification for barring hearsay evidence in
civil and criminal cases would require policymakers to reevaluate the excep-
tions to the doctrine under Federal Rule of Evidence 803—which allows into
evidence so-called reliable hearsay, even though the reliability of such evidence
168. See supra Part III.
169. See Swift, supra note 69, at 495–98; see also David Crump, The Case for Selective Abolition of
the Rules of Evidence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 585, 612–14 (2006); George F. James, The Role of Hearsay
in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REV. 788, 790–94 (1940); Jack B. Weinstein, Probative
Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 338–39 (1961).
170. See supra Part II.B.
171. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
172. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
173. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (discussing the testing of evidence through the “crucible of
cross-examination”). It should be noted that, although the right of confrontation attaches in criminal
trials as a matter of constitutional law, under a procedural justice rationale for the hearsay rule, a similar
right could attach as a policy matter in civil trials as well.
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currently has no empirical support—and under Federal Rule of Evidence 804—
which allows into evidence potentially unreliable hearsay statements for fear of
losing all evidence on a particular issue at trial.174 These concerns would prove
challenging, as would the concerns facing any coherent framework for justify-
ing the bar on hearsay evidence. Any such rationale, however, would represent
an improvement from the current state of the doctrine, in which hearsay is
banned largely on account of folk wisdom about juror cognition that is unsup-
ported by empirical research.175
The findings reported here also have implications for practitioners, who make
ground-level decisions about hearsay evidence. There are myriad reasons for
attorneys to use hearsay evidence instead of in-court testimony: a witness could
no longer be alive or could be ill, she could have moved away from the
jurisdiction, she might be unavailable for other important reasons, or she might
refuse to testify.176 The data presented here and elsewhere, however, suggest
that jurors make strong judgments about an attorney’s decision to use hearsay
evidence—almost always negative—that may backfire on the attorney who calls
the hearsay witness.177 It therefore behooves attorneys to think critically about
using hearsay testimony for reasons other than necessity. Any limitations in the
declarant’s testimony that the attorney may seek to obscure through hearsay
might be ferretted out and weighed accordingly by jurors.
B. OBJECTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The findings reported in this Article provide new evidence that challenges the
decisional accuracy rationale for the hearsay rule. Controlled behavioral experi-
ments are, of course, subject to specific limitations of which policymakers
should be mindful. Discussing these limitations—and potential responses to
them—can increase policymakers’ willingness to consider the data and can
provide researchers with future avenues to explore with respect to the hearsay
rule.
Controlled experiments differ from field studies in an important respect: field
studies observe participants in their natural environments whereas laboratory
experiments observe participants’ behavior and judgment in a more uniform
setting.178 Neither design is superior to the other; they each involve important
trade-offs that policymakers should consider. Field experiments have the benefit
174. See supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part III.
176. See Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule,
72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 919 n.82 (1992); Sevier, supra note 107, at 2–3; see also Liza I. Karsai, The
“Horse-Stealer’s” Trial Returns: How Crawford’s Testimonial-Nontestimonial Dichotomy Harms the
Right to Confront Witnesses, the Presumption of Innocence, and the “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”
Standard, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 129, 170 n.228 (2013).
177. See, e.g., Sevier, supra note 107, at 1–2 (finding that jurors make motivational attributions for
the inclusion or exclusion of hearsay evidence).
178. See Lynne ForsterLee & Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effects of Jury-Aid Innovations on Juror
Performance in Complex Civil Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 184, 184–85 (2003); Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
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of external and ecological validity.179 Experimenters who use a field study
methodology can assert with more confidence than an experimenter who em-
ploys a laboratory study that the results reflect what participants actually do in
response to an environmental stimulus. There is always a concern in laboratory
studies that the connection between what is found in the lab and what occurs in
the real world might not be as strong as experimenters believe, although data
collected on this issue suggest that this concern is overstated.180 However, what
field studies gain in external validity, they lose with respect to internal validity—
the ability of the researcher to express with confidence that she measured in her
study what she claims she measured.181
All else equal, controlled laboratory studies contain much greater internal
validity than do field studies, because the environment in a laboratory study—
whether it is a vignette design or a behavioral design—is kept uniform for all
study participants with the exception of the experimental manipulation.182 Thus,
any differences observed among participants in an experiment are attributable
solely to the experimental manipulation. This allows researchers in a controlled
laboratory experiment to reach stronger causal conclusions—that manipulation
X caused response Y—than researchers who employ other empirical methods.
Although field researchers can (and do) attempt to control for potential confound-
ing factors through the use of statistical techniques, many scholars agree that
statistical controls are inferior to a randomly assigned experimental design in
which the manipulation is all that differs among the experimental conditions.183
Moreover, true threats to external validity involve an interaction between the
functional relationship being studied—that is, the effect of the independent
variable on the dependent variable—and the setting—a laboratory simulation
versus a field test. That the overall level of an effect is higher or lower in one
setting compared to another is rarely a matter of concern among scientists;
indeed, by definition it is not a concern when the question is whether a
hypothesized functional relationship exists or not. External validity concerns
arise when an independent variable increases a dependent variable in one setting
but decreases it in the other setting. Were an effect found in one setting to
merely disappear in the other setting, that might or might not be a concern from
a policy perspective, but that would depend on the details of the policy question.
The vignettes employed in the studies reported here provide important infor-
mation regarding how participants evaluate hearsay evidence. The trials in both
supra note 125, at 483; see also Justin Sevier, The Unintended Consequences of Local Rules, 21
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291, 324–25 (2011).
179. Sevier, supra note 178, at 325 & n.249.
180. See Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal
Decision Making, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 61, 73 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
181. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
182. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 125, at 93–96.
183. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 125, at 93–122 (discussing the strengths, weaknesses, and
tradeoffs among controlled laboratory experiments, field experiments, quasi-experiments, and natural
experiments).
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studies were the same in nearly every respect—except the hearsay manipulation—
and revealed stark differences and significant trends among participants with
respect to the manner in which they evaluate hearsay evidence. A field study
design, in which different participants would likely be exposed to different
cases with different facts, would not be able to produce statements of causality
with respect to people’s perceptions of hearsay evidence that are as strong as a
laboratory design. Nonetheless, field studies of hearsay evidence—which have
not yet been conducted by empirical researchers—should be the next step in
gathering data about hearsay evidence. Using publicly available data, ambitious
researchers could code real cases for the presence or absence of hearsay
evidence, the type of hearsay that was submitted, and code for (and ultimately
control for) factors such as the charges against the defendant, demographics of
the relevant legal actors, and the complexity of the trial in order to draw
conclusions from cases involving hearsay in the real world. The external and
ecological validity reported by such cases would complement the internal
validity supplied by controlled laboratory studies and, together, would supply
convergent validity for how laypeople think about hearsay evidence.184 At the
least, other researchers should consider replicating the results reported in this
Article in a videotaped trial or a live reenactment.
CONCLUSION
Evidence rule makers have created a hearsay policy quagmire in the absence
of data that could assist them in determining whether the dangers they see in
hearsay evidence have an empirical basis, and whether their understanding of
the values that the hearsay doctrine is designed to protect match the values of
the citizens they serve. The studies reported in this Article provide a framework
for understanding how the public thinks about hearsay and challenge the
common law rationale, conceptualized in Professor Tribe’s testimonial triangle,
that the hearsay rule promotes decisional accuracy.
Policymakers should consider the evidence reported in this Article when
examining the concerns that the hearsay rule is designed to remedy. Did the
outrage over the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton stem from a belief that
incompetent jurors could have clumsily evaluated pernicious hearsay evidence,
or did the outrage stem from a philosophical antipathy over the Crown’s refusal
to produce the accusing witness to face Throckmorton? Policymakers’ answers
to this question will assist them in designing a hearsay rule that aligns with the
policy preferences of their citizens and achieves lasting popular legitimacy.
184. Convergent validity is defined as the ability to demonstrate an empirical phenomenon across a
variety of populations and experimental designs. See, e.g., Donald T. Campbell & Donald W. Fiske,
Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix, 56 PSYCHOL. BULL. 81,
100 (1959).
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